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THE PECULIAR CHALLENGES POSED BY LATENT DISEASES
RESULTING FROM MASS PRODUCTS
DONALD G. GIFFORD*
ABSTRACT
Legal actions against manufacturers of products that cause la-
tent diseases, such as asbestos products, cigarettes, lead pigment, and
Agent Orange, are the signature torts of our time. Yet within this
rather important subset of tort liability, it is unlikely that the imposi-
tion of liability actually results in loss prevention. Three factors,
present in varying combinations in the context of latent diseases re-
suiting from product exposure, frustrate the deterrent impact of liabil-
ity. First, an extended period of time-sometimes decades-passes
between the time of the manufacturer's distribution of the product
and the imposition of liability. Second, the accident compensation
system frequently is unable to attribute liability for damages to the
activity that caused the harm. Third, activities of parties other than
the product manufacturer generally are necessary contributing causes
to the victim's latent disease. It is not axiomatic that the manufac-
turer is the "cheapest cost avoider"; indeed, the determination of the
cheapest cost avoider may depend upon cultural attitudes, not value-
neutral economic analysis. The questionable ability of the tort system
to fulfill its loss avoidance objective suggests that compensation for
latent diseases should be handled by an administrative no-fault com-
pensation system and that legislative or administrative regulation
must play a larger role in preventing such harms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Costs of Accidents' was written against a landscape of contro-
versy over automobile accident no-fault plans
2 and the then-recent
emergence of strict products liability.
3 A generation later, the signa-
ture torts of our time, claims against manufacturers of asbestos, ciga-
rettes, lead pigment and other mass products that cause latent disease,
offer new challenges and complexities for any system of allocating the
costs of accidents, including either the traditional tort system or
others premised upon the analysis presented in The Costs of Accidents.
Within this important subset of tort liability, three factors-pre-
sent in varying combinations-complicate the ability of any accident
compensation system to deter harmful conduct; that is, to use Profes-
sor (nowJudge) Guido Calabresi's terminology, to reduce primary ac-
cident costs. First, an extended period of time-sometimes decades-
often has passed between the time of the manufacturer's distribution
of a product and the victim's manifestation of disease.
4 In the case of
some disease-producing products, most notably asbestos and lead pig-
1. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
2. The first chapter of The Costs of Accidents, for example, largely describes then-cur-
rent proposals addressing liability for the costs of automobile accidents. Id. at 3-13.
3. Id. at 13-14. The adoption of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
1964, providing for strict liability in the case of claims against product sellers, was viewed 
at
the time as "the most radical and spectacular development" in twentieth-century American
tort law. Robert W. Miller, Significant New Concepts of Tort Liability-Strict Liability, 17 SYRA-
CUSE L. REv. 25, 29 (1966) (quoting American Law Institute Meeting, 32 U.S.L.W. 2623, 2627
(1964)).
4. See infta notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
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ment, the defendant may have stopped producing the disease-causing
product long before the litigation.5 These realities raise questions as
to the implications for loss avoidance or deterrence when liability is
not imposed until decades later.6 The imposition of liability years af-
ter the manufacture and distribution of a disease-producing producthas ceased cannot prevent harm caused by that specific product.
While the fact that asbestos and similar other products are no longer
being manufactured may be the exception and not the rule amonglatent diseases caused by mass products, for the tort system to ignore
these examples is analogous to ignoring the elephant in the room.7
Even if the product causing a latent disease continues to be manufac-
tured, the delay between the time of the distribution of the product
and the subsequent liability decreases any deterrent impact such lia-
bility may have in encouraging the specific manufacturer or another.
manufacturer to avoid marketing disease-producing products in the
future.
The second complexity posed by latent diseases resulting from
exposure to mass products is the frequent inability of the accident
compensation system to assess liability to the actor and to the activity
that has caused the harm.' At the most basic level, the issue is thefrequent inability of the victim suffering from childhood lead poison-ing, DES-induced cancer, tobacco-related disease, or some other la-
tent disease, to identify which manufacturer produced the product
that caused her disease and therefore should be held liable.9 In The
Costs of Accidents, Calabresi dismisses the notion that a requirement ofliability should be that an individual injurer must compensate his indi-
vidual victim,1" thus foreshadowing the eventual adoption by some
courts of market share liability and other means of imposing collective
responsibility on manufacturers."t Yet even if we dispense with a re-quirement that a victim seeking compensation identify the specific
manufacturer(s) of the product causing her disease, it is still necessary
5. It was not the case, of course, at the time of the filing of the first successful litiga-tion against asbestos manufacturers in 1969, that asbestos products were no longer being
sold and distributed. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1086 (5thCir. 1973). Before Bore however, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration(OSHA) had promulgated a series of increasingly restrictive regulations that effectivelyprevented the use of asbestos products in most commercial settings. See infra note 252 and
accompanying text.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra notes 39-44 (discussing the scope of asbestos liability).
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Part V.A. 1.
10. THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 22-23, 302.
11. See infra Part V.A.2.
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to determine how much each manufacturer of a product must con-
tribute to the compensation pool. The passage of decades between
the distribution of the product and the victims' manifestation of the
disease generally makes any accurate or meaningful assessments of the
manufacturers' relative shares of causal contribution difficult or im-
possible. Calabresi himself acknowledges that while collective liability
would be more just, it "may not be feasible."' 2
More important than any difficulty or impossibility in assessing
the shares of liability of the actors who causally contributed to the
latent disease is the inability to assess liability for the costs of latent
diseases to the activity that caused the disease.
3 After the passage of
years since the time of distribution of the disease-causing product, the
manufacturing firms remaining when victims seek compensation-
many firms that manufactured the product at the time that the victims
were exposed to it will no longer be in business or will be insolvent-
in all probability are engaged in the manufacture of a variety of other
products, probably none of which causes disease. Hence, the costs of
latent diseases often are paid by activities other than those generating
the injuries-hardly a desirable result from the perspective of law and
economics or welfare economics.
The third-and closely related-complexity is that the activities
of parties other than product manufacturers often are necessary con-
tributing causes to the victims' latent diseases.
4 The manufacture of
cigarettes is a cause of the smoker's lung cancer, but so is the smoker's
unwillingness to quit smoking after she becomes aware that smoking is
dangerous. 5 The manufacture of lead-based paint is an actual cause
of a child's developing lead poisoning eighty years later, but so is the
landlord's failure to prevent painted surfaces from deteriorating.'
6 In
traditional tort terms, such issues were analyzed under the rubrics of
contributory and comparative negligence,
7 assumption of risk,'" and
12. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 302.
13. See infta Part V.B.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See, e.g., Horton v. Am. Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1292-93 (Miss. 1995) (hold-
ing that a smoker with lung cancer could not recover damages on a strict products 
liability
claim where he continued to smoke despite his knowledge of the risks of smoking).
16. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text; Part VI.C.
17. E.g., Horton, 667 So. 2d at 1292-93 (holding that a plaintiff's comparative fault may
defeat recovery on a strict products liability claim).
18. E.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148 (3rd Cir. 1998) (noting that a
plaintiff's assumption of a known risk can be used to disprove causation in strict 
products
liability claims).
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superseding cause. 19 Calabresi addresses similar issues as a part of his
inquiry into which party is the cheapest cost avoider.20 The often-re-
flexive conclusion of the courts is that manufacturers are the cheapest
cost avoiders.2  In reality, the question of "Who is the cheapest cost
avoider?" may be either so complicated that it is impossible as a practi-
cal matter to determine, or may be dependent upon cultural, ideolog-
ical, or political beliefs, not economic analysis.2 2
The collective impact of these three factors, present in varying
combinations in the contexts of specific latent diseases caused by ex-
posure to mass products, suggests the possible futility of achieving the
goal 23 of primary accident cost avoidance, not only in the tort system's
handling of latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass products,
but with any accident compensation system's treatment of such
injuries.
Part VIII considers the implications of this conclusion for the
handling of compensation claims of victims of latent diseases. Implicit
throughout The Costs of Accidents, particularly in Calabresi's criticism of
government-funded or government-subsidized compensation systems,
is his apparent view that primary accident cost avoidance is first
among equals when it comes to the goals of an accident compensation
system. Calabresi is careful not to recommend any particular accident
compensation system to the exclusion of others,2 4 but he does criticize
two features, either or both of which are frequently present in alterna-
tive no-fault compensation systems. First, he argues that restricting
victims' recovery to economic losses would undermine the goal of pri-
mary accident cost avoidance by alleviating the need for the injurer to
consider the full consequences of his actions.2 5 Second, for essentially
19. E.g., Foister v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (find-ing that the learned intermediary doctrine severs the liability of a pharmaceutical company
where the prescribing physician had been adequately warned of risks).
20. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 135-73.
21. See infra notes 244-247 and accompanying text.
22. For discussion of these points, see infra Part VI, particularly Part VI.E.
23. Calabresi's nomenclature identifies only two goals for an accident compensation
system: "First, it must be just or fair; second, it must reduce the costs of accidents." THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 24. He then identifies three "subgoals" includingprimary accident cost avoidance, secondary accident cost avoidance, and tertiary accident
cost avoidance. Id. at 26-31; see infra Part III.A-B. For my purposes, no confusion is created
by referring to these three "subgoals" simply as "goals."
24. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
25. Calabresi argues, "[i]f a fully appropriate general deterrence marketjudgment for
or against accidents is to be made, [damages for pain and suffering and other elements for
which there is no ready market value] must be valued in some way." Id. at 206. He notes
that excluding some types of non-economic damages, those described as "fanciful or senti-
mental," poses "interesting implications for general deterrence which are paralleled to a
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the same reasons, Calabresi opposes full or partial government fund-
ing of an accident compensation system.
26
If, however, we give up on the goal of primary accident cost avoid-
ance because any attempt to achieve this goal in the context of latent
diseases resulting from exposure to mass products is problematic, Cal-
abresi's other goals for the accident compensation system-secondary
accident cost avoidance (loss distribution)27 and tertiary accident cost
avoidance (reduction of administrative costs) 2 8 -arguably suggest that
compensation for latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass
products should be handled by an administrative no-fault compensa-
tion system. In short, a careful analysis of Calabresi's principal goals,
when applied to the mass products/latent disease context, appears to
conflict with his more specific objections to government-subsidized
compensation programs that limit recovery to economic losses.
This Article does not purport to analyze in detail the admittedly
difficult problems inherent in the design of an administrative com-
pensation system for latent-disease injuries. Part VIII does, however,
briefly consider some of the major issues in designing such a program,
including the definition of the compensable event
29 and the funding
for an administrative compensation program.3 ° These issues are both
critical to the design of any alternative compensation system and diffi-
cult to resolve. I argue, however, that the difficulties in the details of
administration should not obscure the conclusion that such a com-
pensation system would be preferable to the current tort system's han-
dling of latent-disease injuries, which fails to accomplish Calabresi's
greater or lesser degree whenever accident costs are misvalued." Id. at 216. Specifically,
the likely accident victim may be deterred from engaging in conduct possibly resulting in
injury, because the victim will seek to avoid the injury even if it is to be compensated, at the
same time that the injurer is deterred by the prospect of liability. Id. at 217-19. The result
of this combination, according to Calabresi, may be too much primary cost avoidance and,
as a result, too little injury-producing, but otherwise presumably desirable, activity. Id. Cal-
abresi finds, however, "[t]his question need not detain us unduly, . . as there are several
objections, both theoretical and practical, to the basic assumptions that give rise to the
problem." Id. at 219. Ultimately, he concludes that "as far as general deterrence is con-
cerned, the problem of nonmonetizable costs, though substantial, is not unmanageable."
Id. at 224. The more common types of such costs can be valued in the same manner as
other damages are valued, and "some highly individual and hard-to-value items of costs"
can remain with the victims. Id. at 224-25.
26. Id. at 6-7, 10-13; see infra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
27. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 39-67; see infra notes 119-123 and accom-
panying text.
28. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 28; see infra notes 124-125 and accompa-
nying text.
29. See infra Part VIII.B.
30. See infra Part VIII.C.
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three goals of reducing accident costs through primary accident cost
avoidance, distributing losses, and controlling administrative costs.
To set the stage for this analysis of the handling of mass product
tort latent diseases when considered through the lens of Calabresi's
goals for an accident compensation system, I begin in Part II with adescription of how latent diseases resulting from mass products torts
have transformed the reality of tort law. Before turning my attention
to the argument that primary accident cost avoidance is likely to be
futile when it comes to such latent diseases, Part III briefly summarizes
Calabresi's description of the goals he suggests for an accident com-
pensation system.
II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF TORTIOUS HARM
The landscape of tort liability has been fundamentally altered
since the publication of The Costs of Accidents in 1970. While more
mundane claims, such as those resulting from automobile accidents,
continue to be more common,3" the past generation has seen an ex-
plosion of legal claims alleging that the victims suffer from latent dis-
eases arising from exposure to mass products. The earliest successful
mass product/latent disease cases were filed in the early 1960s,32 but it
was the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit against the manufacturers of asbestos insulation products in
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. that began the onslaught.33
The factual background of asbestos litigation is well known. As-
bestos, a fibrous mineral, was used extensively in insulation and otherproducts until the 1970s because of its heat resistance, flexibility, and
tensile strength. 4 Millions of people were exposed to asbestos dust
generated, for example, by insulation materials.35 The inhalation of
asbestos fibers causes diseases ranging from asbestosis, a lung disease
resulting in the destruction of air sacs in the lung, to mesothelioma
and other lung cancers. 6 Medical research had begun to reveal the
31. SeeJAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 14 tbl.2 (RAND Inst. for CivilJustice, Doc. No. R-3391-ICJ, 1986).
32. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Stoy-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Liti-gation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 132-33 (1968) (discussing tort claims filed in the early 1 960s
against Richardson-Merrell, Inc., manufacturer of a cholesterol-lowering drug, MER/29,
that caused cataracts and skin and hair problems).
33. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming the trial court's decision in favor of an
asbestos insulation worker suffering from mesothelioma, a particularly virulent form of
cancer affecting the membranes enclosing the lungs, heart, or abdomen).
34. See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Weinstein,
J.).
35. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083-84; Falise, 94 F. Supp. at 323-24.
36. Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
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health hazards resulting from exposure to asbestos by the early de-
cades of the twentieth century.3 7 Manufacturers of asbestos products
not only failed to warn consumers of these hazards, but also actively
concealed the risks of exposure to asbestos by, among other means,
altering and censoring research results.3"
Since the Borel decision in 1973, more than 600,000 claims have
been filed based upon allegations of asbestos-related illnesses or the
fear of such diseases, 9 more than $54 billion has already been paid in
compensation and litigation expenses,4 ° and, as a result, at least sixty
defendant companies have filed for bankruptcy.4 1 The claims against
the bankruptcy trust of the Manville Corp., once the world's largest
asbestos-products manufacturer, are now paid off at five cents on the
dollar.42 Experts predict that eventually, somewhere between one and
three million claims will be filed,4" with a cost estimated between $145
and $210 billion.44
Asbestos was just the start of the explosion in litigation arising out
of latent diseases caused by exposure to mass products. Beginning in
1978, veterans of the Vietnam War filed class actions and individual
cases against the United States and various manufacturers of a defoli-
ant commonly known as Agent Orange, alleging that it contained
small amounts of dioxin that caused a variety of horrible health
problems, including cancers, skin disorders, and birth defects in the
children of those exposed.45 The cases were consolidated and trans-
37. Id. For discussion of this research, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT:
THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 10-14 (1985).
38. Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25.
39. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN IN-
TERIM REPORT 40 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Doc. No. DB-397-ICS, 2002), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/DB39 7 .pdf. Many claimants, although ex-
posed to asbestos, currently have little or no functional impairment. Id. at 45. Increas-
ingly, those filing claims have worked in "nontraditional industries" other than those
industries, such as insulation contracting and shipbuilding, where most asbestos claimants
historically had worked. Id. at 47. For example, claims are being filed by textile workers
who have been exposed to machine tools containing asbestos gaskets or who worked in
factories with ventilation systems that contained asbestos. Id. at 47-48.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id. at 71.
42. Id. at 80 (citation omitted). At the time it filed for bankruptcy, Manville was the
largest American industrial company ever to do so. See BRODEUR, supra note 37, at 3.
43. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 39, at 78 (noting that the 600,000 claims already
filed represent between one-half and one-fifth of the final number of expected claims).
44. Id.
45. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS 23-57 (1986) (describing the development and initial filings of the cases
against Agent Orange manufacturers).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ferred to Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York4 6
who certified a class including an estimated 250,000 claimants.4 7 The
defendants eventually settled for $180 million.4"
Latent diseases often have resulted from the use of pharmaceuti-
cal products. Most observers of the tort system are familiar with the
litigation arising out of the use of diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic
estrogen used to prevent miscarriages and for a variety of other medi-
cal conditions.4 9 DES caused a variety of cancers and other diseases,
in both the mothers who had used the drug and in their daughters.5 °
In 1979, the first jury verdicts against DES manufacturers were en-
tered: a New York jury awarded $500,000 to a woman with cancer
whose mother had used DES, and a Michigan jury awarded $800,000
in a similar case. 51 By the early 1990s, there were one thousand cases
pending against DES manufacturers, 52 and plaintiffs represented that
there were as many as 430,000 victims who were eligible for inclusion
in a class action.53 Similarly, 190,000 claims were filed during the
bankruptcy proceedings of A.H. Robins, Inc., the manufacturer of the
Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) that alleg-
edly caused pelvic inflammation and septic abortions.54 A.H. Robins,
the sole manufacturer of the product, paid $378.3 million to claim-
ants and $107.3 million in legal fees before declaring bankruptcy. 55
The bankruptcy court established a $2.475 billion trust to pay those
victims that had not yet been compensated. 56 The histories of the lia-
bilities resulting from silicone breast implants5 7 and the diet drug fen-
phen 5 are similar.
46. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 750-52 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); Comment, Procedural History of The Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 52 BROOK.
L. REV. 335, 335 (1986).
47. Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litiga-
tion: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 1002 (1993).
48. Id.
49. See ROBERT MEYERS, D.E.S.: THE BITTER PILL 215-230 (1983); Hensler & Peterson,
supra note 47, at 981-83.
50. Tracey I. Batt, Note, DES Third-Generation Liability: A Proximate Cause, 18 CARDozo L.
REV. 1217, 1218-22 (1996).
51. MEYERS, supra note 49, at 222-23.
52. Hensler & Peterson, supra note 47, at 983.
53. Kurczi v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 667, 672 (N.D. Ohio 1995).
54. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 47, at 983-84.
55. Id. at 986.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 992-98. By 1995, 248,500 women had claimed illness as a result of silicon
breast implants. MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 80 (1996).
58. See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 1203, Civil Action No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275 (E.D. Pa.
[VOL. 64:613
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As has been illustrated by these specific examples, once litigation
seeking redress for diseases caused by a particular product "ma-
tures, 5 9 the compensation often has been dispensed by an adminis-
trative structure created either by a bankruptcy court or by an agreed-
upon settlement between the parties in a class action.6 ° Professor
Richard A. Nagareda describes the compensation mechanisms that
have been established by class action settlements as follows:
In recent years, class actions have played a highly controver-
sial role .. centered on widely reported multibillion-dollar
class settlements designed to resolve, in one fell swoop,
whole categories of mass tort litigation and, in so doing, to
afford defendants "global peace." Leading examples include
class settlements involving asbestos, silicone gel breast im-
plants, and most recently, the diet drug combination popu-
larly known as fen-phen. Each of these settlements has its
own nuances, but all aspire to create some form of private
administrative system that would pay compensation to claim-
ants according to a preestablished grid. In this manner, class
settlements seek to shift claims from the ordinary tort system
to a private regime that promises more efficient compensa-
Aug. 28, 2000); Fen-phen Maker Agrees to $3.75 Billion Settlement, CNN.com, Oct. 8, 1999, at
http://www.cnn.com/HEALTH/diet.fitness/9910/08/fen.phen.
59. A mass tort is mature when
there has been full and complete discovery, multiple jury verdicts, and a persis-
tent vitality in the plaintiffs' intentions. Typically at the mature stage, little or no
new evidence will be developed, significant appellate review of any novel legal
issues has been concluded, and at least one full cycle of trial strategies has been
exhausted.
Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1821, 1843 (1995)
(quoting Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REv. 659,
659 (1989)).
60. But see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597, 625, 628 (1997).
Amchem involved a nationwide "opt-out" settlement class for current and future asbestos
claims, certified under Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 597-
605. The Court held that given the size and diversity of the class, the class did not satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirement that issues of law and fact common to the class predominate
over issues that affect only individual members of the class. Id. at 622-25. The Court also
held that the class did not satisfy Rule 23(a) (4), a prerequisite for all class actions, which
requires that the named parties adequately protect the interests of the class as a whole. Id.
at 625-28. The class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a) (4) because the interests of claimants al-
ready suffering injuries-immediate and substantial compensation-were at odds with the
interests of potential future claimants who had been exposed to asbestos but who had yet
to suffer any injury-the continued vitality of the fund for the satisfaction of future claims.
Id.; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 854-59 (1999) (overturning the certifi-
cation of a mandatory "limited fund" class under Rule 23(b) (1) (B) in part because of the
failure to address properly conflicts of interest within the class).
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tion for plaintiffs, long-term peace for defendants, and a re-
duced litigation burden for the courts. 61
Yet another new-and distinctive-generation of mass products
torts litigation was launched in 1994 when American states filed ac-
tions against tobacco companies, seeking reimbursement or "recoup-
ment" for the expenditures they had been forced to make as a result
of tobacco-related illnesses, primarily their payments to victims of to-
bacco-related diseases under state medical assistance (Medicaid) pro-
grams.62 The litigation was prompted in part by new discoveries in
the early 1990s that cigarette manufacturers had not only concealed
and affirmatively misrepresented the health risks caused by smoking,
but also had purposefully designed their product to foster addiction.
Victims of lung cancer and other tobacco-related diseases had
sued manufacturers throughout the preceding four decades with only
failure.63 Suits filed by state and local governments, however, offered
the possibility of matching the tobacco companies' litigation resources
and of circumventing the obstacles that had proven so difficult to
overcome in the past; among others, the inability to prove that one
particular manufacturer's products had caused a victim's disease or
the contention that the victim's own knowledge of the dangers of
smoking should preclude recovery. Eventually the legal actions by the
states were settled for payments by the tobacco companies totaling
$206 billion as well as their agreement to abide by certain other re-
strictions, including a requirement to refrain from youth-oriented ad-
vertising.64 The settlement did not preclude or formally affect actions
brought by individuals or those seeking reimbursement of costs sus-
tained by health care insurers or labor union health funds,65 and so
61. Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action,
115 HARv. L. REv. 747, 751 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
62. See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING To-
BACCO 176, 179, 189-93 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Third Wave]; Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN.
L. REv. 741, 757-64 (2003); Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 337-42 (2001) [hereinafter Tobacco Litigation]. Copies of the com-
plaints filed by the states are available at the website of the Tobacco Control Archives at the
University of California, San Francisco, http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/
states.html (last updated Jan. 25, 2004).
63. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REv.
853, 874 (1992) [hereinafter Sociolegal History] (noting that prior to 1991, the tobacco in-
dustry had not paid out a single tort award after thirty-five years of litigation).
64. Rabin, Tobacco Litigation, supra note 62, at 340.
65. Id. at 33940.
[VOL. 64:613
2005] LATENT DISEASES RESULTING FROM MASS PRODUCTS 625
litigation filed on behalf of those individuals6 6 and groups
67 has
continued.
The success of the tobacco settlement spawned recoupment ac-
tions by state and municipal governments against other industries
whose products allegedly caused disease or injury that necessitated
government expenditures, including actions against manufacturers of
handguns used in the commission of crimes" and lawsuits against
manufacturers of lead pigment, which was used to make lead-based
paint, and which causes childhood lead poisoning.69 Handgun inju-
ries and deaths, of course, are not latent diseases, though they do
share some of the characteristics of latent diseases caused by exposure
to mass products. 70 Childhood lead poisoning may result in impaired
cognitive function, behavior difficulties, impaired hearing, reduced
stature, and, in extreme but now rare cases, even death.7' Lead-based
paint for use in the interior of residences has not been sold since
1978, when it was banned by federal law, 72 but more than eighty per-
cent of the lead paint used in residential housing was applied before
1940, and less than four percent was applied after 1960. 73 Childhood
lead poisoning can be almost entirely prevented by maintaining resi-
66. E.g., Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506 (D.N.J. 2002).
67. E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 345
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (health insurer); Steanifitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999) (union health and welfare fund).
68. E.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d
536 (3d Cir. 2001); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
69. Eg., In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L-2754-01, 2002 WL 31474528 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 4, 2002); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001); see Gifford, supra note 62, at 769-74.
I have served as Chair of the Maryland Lead Paint Poisoning Commission (1992-95)
and as a consultant or advisor to both Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky LLP of Wash-
ington, D.C., which represents E.I. du Pont de Nemours, and to the National Paint and
Coatings Association, on state legislative solutions to eliminate childhood lead poisoning
resulting from exposure to lead-based paint. I have also consulted briefly with Dickstein
Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky LLP on various issues in State v. Lead Industries Ass'n. Obviously,
the views expressed in this Article reflect only my personal views and not those of any entity
with which I have been affiliated.
70. See infra notes 297-301.
71. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENVTL. HEALTH RISKS AND SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN,
ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT
HAZARDS 1 (2000) [hereinafter PRESIDENT's TASK FORCE], available at http://www.hud.
gov/offices/lead/reports/fedstrategy
2 0 0 0
.pdf.
72. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing Lead-Con-
taining Paint, 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (2004); see also Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Pr'pvention
Act, Pub. L. No. 91-695, tit. IV, § 401, 84 Stat. 2078, 2079 (1971) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 4831 (2000)) (prohibiting the use of lead-based paint in residential structures
constructed or rehabilitated with Federal assistance in any form).
73. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 22 tbl.4.
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dential units properly so that lead-based paint is not allowed to deteri-
orate into chips and dust accessible to children.74 As of this time, the
lawsuits brought by either individuals or governments against manu-
facturers of lead-based paint and lead pigment have not been success-
ful.75 Actions brought on behalf of lead-poisoned children against
landlords who failed to maintain their properties, however, have had
more success.
76
The proliferation of mass products torts generally, and specifi-
cally of claims for latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass
products, unleashed a virtual avalanche of academic commentary sug-
gesting procedural and institutional reforms.77 Generally absent,
however, was any analysis of the more basic issues of how the recur-
ring features of latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass prod-
ucts may frustrate the fundamental tort goal of accident cost
reduction.
Parts IV through VI undertake such an analysis. I illustrate the
analysis with the examples of diseases caused by exposure to asbestos,
tobacco-related disease, and childhood lead poisoning. There are a
variety of reasons for selecting these product-related diseases, includ-
ing their high profile and prominence in defining the contemporary
tort landscape, their sharing of certain characteristics that are com-
74. See id. at 4; REPORT OF THE LEAD PAINT POISONING COMMISSION 3 (State of Md.,
1994) [hereinafter MD. LEAD PAINT REPORT] ("The single most important source of child-
hood lead poisoning in Maryland is lead-contaminated dust resulting from, among other
sources, deteriorating lead-based paint in the older housing stock.").
75. E.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 1-03-3276, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 14(Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 14, 2005); In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L-2754-01, 2002 WL 31474528 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 4, 2002); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997).
But see State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super. LEXIS 37, at *28 (R.I.
Super. Ct., Apr. 2, 2001) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss the State's public nui-
sance claim); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus. Inc., Appeal No. 03-2786, 2004 Wisc. App.
LEXIS 885 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2004) (reversing the trial court dismissal of claims against
manufacturers of lead-based paint and remanding for trial). State v. Lead Industry Ass'n
went to trial in 2002 and ended in a hungjury. C.A. No. 99-5226, 2004 R.I. Super. LEXIS
56, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 2004). The case is scheduled to be retried in 2005. Id. at
*4. For discussion of the case, see Gifford, supra note 62, at 770-74.
76. E.g., Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 835 A.2d 616 (Md. 2003) (affirming the inter-
mediate appellate court's reversal of a $750,000 jury verdict and remanding for a new trial,
but holding that the plaintiffs were not required to prove that a landlord had knowledge of
lead paint hazards); Brown v. Dermer, 744 A.2d 47 (Md. 2000) (trial court's decision to
grant defendant landlord's motion for summary judgment reversed); see also Ohio Jury
Awards $100,000 To Lead-Poisoned Boy, MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: LEAD, Aug. 13, 2003, at 11; $2M
Verdict For Virginia Girl, MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: LEAD, Apr. 16, 2003, at 2.
77. E.g., Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in
Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1867 (2000); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate
Mass Tort Litigation, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999); Nagareda, supra note 61; Peter H.
Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941 (1995).
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monly found in most latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass
products, and, most importantly, their differences. Though the simi-
larities and differences will be explored throughout the Article, a few
of the differences are identified here because they guide the structure
of the analysis. First, although all three categories of product-caused
disease generally involve the passage of a substantial period of time
between the use of the product and the manifestation of the illness,
tobacco manufacturers continue to market their disease-producing
products but manufacturers of asbestos and lead-based paint do not.
Second, sometimes-but probably not in a majority of cases-it is pos-
sible to identify the specific manufacturer of the cigarettes or asbestos
products that caused a victim's disease; for all intents and purposes
this is impossible in the case of childhood lead poisoning. Third, vic-
tims themselves arguably share some of the responsibility for tobacco-
related disease; this is far less likely with asbestos-caused diseases and
never the case with childhood lead poisoning. The activities of parties
other than manufacturers and victims, however, may contribute caus-
ally to childhood lead poisoning, and perhaps to asbestos-related dis-
ease, in ways that generally are not present in the case of tobacco-
related disease.
III. CALABREsi's GOALS FOR AN ACCIDENT COMPENSATION SYSTEM
The Costs of Accidents does not purport to prescribe a particular
accident compensation system. 78 Instead, its goal is to identify the cri-
teria or goals against which any accident compensation system, includ-
ing our current tort system, can be assessed.79 As such, The Costs of
Accidents is a seminal work espousing an instrumental theory of tort
law "as a means of forwarding the community's aggregate welfare
through a strategy of maximization often expressed in economic
terms."8 The last twenty years have spawned a diametrically different
academic perspective-with its intellectual roots returning to the juris-
prudence of Oliver Wendell Holmes8 ' and even the philosophies of
Aristotle and Kant 8 2-viewing tort law largely as a matter of corrective
78. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
79. Id. at 15.
80. ERNESTJ. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 48 (1995). Along with Calabresi, the
other leading tort theorist identified with an instrumental view is Judge Richard A. Posner.
See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (6th ed. 2003); Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972).
81. See WEINRIB, supra note 80, at 3.
82. See id. at 19.
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justice, as a means of requiring the injuring party to repair the losses
caused by his or her wrongful conduct."3
Without taking sides in this clash of the grand theories of tort law,
it seems safe to assume as a descriptive matter that instrumental goals
guided the development of products liability law during the twentieth
century.84 Further, the instrumental goals identified by Calabresi ap-
pear to be the appropriate ones for assessing the performance of the
legal system's current handling of latent diseases resulting from expo-
sure to mass products. Although Parts IV through VI of this Article
use Calabresian analysis to illustrate the difficulties of achieving what
he calls "'primary' reduction of accident costs"85 or "primary accident
cost avoidance" 6 in the context of latent diseases resulting from expo-
sure to mass products torts, the difficulty-or impossibility-of achiev-
ing this objective is present in any accident compensation system that
purports to deter or reduce conduct resulting in latent diseases by the
imposition of liability for the costs of the diseases.
A. Primary Accident Cost Avoidance
Calabresi begins his analysis in The Costs of Accidents by identifying
fairness and the reduction of accident costs as the two goals of an
accident compensation system.87 He then suggests that justice "is not
a goal but rather a ... veto '88 on any accident compensation system
designed to reduce the costs of accidents. Calabresi finds justice to be
"by far the harder of the two goals to analyze," 9 and he suggests that
it is "elusive."9 ° For Calabresi, justice imposes two requirements on a
system of accident law. First, "[i]t ... requires some consistency in
what is done within the area of accident law."'" Second, it requires
that an accident compensation system be accepted by the "[m]oral
83. SeeJULEs L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 361 (1992). See generally WEINRIB, supra
note 80.
84. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980) (adopting market
share liability to further the goals of loss minimization and loss distribution); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing
that product manufacturers should be held strictly liable for defective products on the
grounds of loss minimization and loss distribution); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (justifying the elimination of a requirement of privity in an
implied warranty claim on the grounds of loss minimization and loss distribution)
85. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 26.
86. Id. at 68.
87. Id. at 24.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at 24.
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 293.
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attitudes" of the public.9 2 Calabresi finds that "moral attitudes are...
complex,"9 3 but that "[n] o system of accident law can operate unless it
takes into account which acts are deemed good, which deemed evil,
and which deemed neutral."9 4 He argues that the public's acceptance
of any accident compensation system as just ultimately depends
largely on whether it can be shown to the public that such a system
reduces accident costs.9 5 Hence, if an accident compensation system
achieves primary accident cost avoidance, secondary accident cost
avoidance (loss minimization), and tertiary cost avoidance (keeping
administrative costs low), it will probably, over time, be regarded as
fair and just.96
In terms of reducing the costs of accidents, Calabresi identifies
three "subgoals" for any accident compensation system.9 7 He uses the
term "primary accident cost avoidance" to refer to what is usually
thought of as accident prevention: "to discourage activities that are
'accident prone' and substitute safer activities as well as safer ways of
engaging in the same activities. " " Calabresi's phrase, "secondary acci-
dent cost avoidance,"99 refers to minimizing the disruptive impact of
the costs of accidents that have already occurred, by what often has
been referred to as "loss distribution"-spreading the costs of acci-
dents among a larger group of people through insurance or raising
the costs of the product that caused the victim's injury. 0 0 Calabresi's
third subgoal of "tertiary cost reduction" seeks "to reduce the costs of
achieving primary and secondary cost reduction." ' Calabresi makes
it clear that this goal is "tertiary" only because its aim is to achieve
efficiency in accomplishing the other two subgoals, and "in a very real
sense this 'efficiency' goal comes first."10 2 Part VII of this Article eval-
92. Id. at 293-94.
93. Id. at 294.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 296-97.
96. A couple of years following publication of The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi and his
co-author Douglas Melamed used the term "other justice" to describe goals other than
economic efficiency and loss distribution. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1102
(1972). They admitted "that it is hard to know what content can be poured into that
term." Id. In the paper he presented at this Symposium, Calabresi described "other jus-
tice" as "the catchall for any other goals that [The Costs of Accidents] does not analyze."
Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REv. 736, 745 (2005).
97. THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 26-28.
98. Id. at 68.
99. Id. at 39.
100. Id. at 27-28.
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id.
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uates the effectiveness of the tort system in accomplishing these latter
two goals when confronted with latent diseases resulting from expo-
sure to mass products.
Calabresi's analytical framework then identifies two means of
achieving primary accident cost avoidance or accident reduction.
First, "specific deterrence" achieves the accident reduction goal
through collective decisions, often accomplished through legislative
or administrative action, to prohibit certain accident-causing activities
or to regulate such activities.103 An example of specific deterrence
would be a ruling by the Food and Drug Administration not to ap-
prove the marketing of a new drug because of the pharmaceutical
manufacturer's failure to test the drug adequately or because other
research has suggested the possibility of harmful consequences.
For our purposes, however, it is the second method of primary
accident cost avoidance, "general deterrence," which is of greater in-
terest. The general deterrence approach "decide [s] what the accident
costs of activities are," and then allows the market to determine how
much of an accident-causing activity there should be and in what man-
ner those activities should be conducted."°4 If, for example, some
users of a power tool are injured, imposing liability on the manufac-
turer for the costs of accidents may lead the manufacturer to decide
(1) to stop manufacturing the power tool, (2) to redesign it or to pro-
vide more adequate warnings, (3) to raise the price of the power tool
so that fewer individuals purchase it in the future and to cover the
costs of the accidents, (4) all of the preceding, or (5) none of the
preceding. The manufacturer and consumers make their choices
among these alternatives based upon their own economic self-
interests.
The approach to accident compensation outlined in The Costs of
Accidents, and indeed any system for allocating the costs of accidents
except a comprehensive social insurance system, must begin with what
Calabresi describes as the "what-is-a-cost-of-what" decision. 11 5 For ex-
ample, are the injuries and deaths caused by handgun violence the
costs of criminal conduct, the marketing and distribution practices of
handgun manufacturers, or the refusal of government authorities to
enact and enforce adequate gun control laws?
The law and economics approach to modern tort law frequently
begins with the premise that "[i]f there were no transaction or infor-
103. Id. at 95.
104. Id. at 69.
105. Id. at 133.
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mation costs associated with paying people to alter their behavior, it
would not matter (in terms of market control of accidents) who bore
the accident costs initially." ' 6 As every first-year tort student learns, in
a world without transaction costs, if liability initially were placed on a
party other than the one who could avoid the accident most cheaply,
that party would "bribe" or pay the party who in fact could avoid the
accident most cheaply."0 7 The difficulty, as Calabresi is quick to point
out, is that not only do transaction costs exist in the real world, but
they often are substantial.10 8 In the real world, as Calabresi illustrates,
if the party initially selected as the party to bear the costs of the acci-
dent is not, in fact, the party able to avoid the accident most cheaply,
the accident precautions adopted may not be optimal and/or their
adoption may require unnecessary expense because of the presence of
transaction costs, particularly those costs involved in negotiation
among the parties.10 9
The initial assignment of liability to a party therefore may be no
more than a starting point, and suggesting how the initial bearer of
liability should be determined is a core component of The Costs of Acci-
dents. Calabresi begins by suggesting that in trying to determine the
initial bearer of liability, we rule out activities that could reduce acci-
dent costs only at a cost deemed obviously unacceptable, either be-
cause of people's preferences for the activity, expressed through the
market economy, or because such activities have a limited or tenuous
causal connection to the resulting accident costs." 0  In choosing
among the remaining alternative activities that are causally connected
with the accident costs, Calabresi offers a series of guidelines. First,
the administrative costs involved in determining the cheapest cost
avoider should not be prohibitively large.11' If they are, the adminis-
trative costs involved in making the determination may be greater
than any reduction in accident costs. Second, the choice of the
cheapest cost avoider should achieve the "maximum degree of inter-
nalization" of the costs of the accidents. 1 2 If, in contrast, for exam-
ple, smokers were initially identified as the probable cheapest cost
avoiders for tobacco-related illnesses, but a substantial share of the
costs of tobacco-related illness were paid by the state and federal gov-
106. Id. at 135. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
107. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 133-36.
108. Id. at 138-39.
109. Id. at 136-37.
110. Id. at 140.
111. Id. at 143-44.
112. Id. at 144.
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ernments through medical assistance programs and by nonsmoking
medical insurance policyholders, these costs would be externalized or
paid by persons other than smokers. This would violate Calabresi's
guideline that the choice of the cheapest cost avoider achieve the
greatest possible cost internalization. Calabresi's third guideline for
picking the initial loss bearer focuses not on which party is the cheap-
est cost avoider, but instead on which party is the "best briber"; that is,
the party who is in the best position to identify who amongst the other
parties can avoid the accident at the cheapest cost, and can then most
readily provide the incentive or disincentives for that party to reduce
the accident costs. 1
13
Calabresi notes that even when the parties are in a bargaining
relationship, and therefore the transaction costs associated with nego-
tiation are relatively low, there may still be reasons to prefer one party
rather than the other as the cheapest cost avoider.'1 4 First, one party
may be in a better position to evaluate the risks of engaging in activity
that leads to accidental injury.115 For example, the asbestos insulation
manufacturer presumably is in a better position to evaluate the health
risks to an insulation installer than is the worker herself. Further, the
party engaged in one activity or another leading to accidental injury
may be in a better position than other parties to obtain insurance at a
reasonable cost.1 6
Finally, and importantly, Calabresi concludes that determination
of the cheapest cost avoider should not be made on a case-by-case
basis." 7 To do so would result in a liability determination somewhat
similar to the traditional tort system. Juries would make individual de-
terminations of which party could have avoided the accident at the
cheapest cost. Calabresi argues that "the jury is very unlikely to be
suitable for selecting the cheapest cost avoiders."'1i Further, any indi-
vidualized determination following the accident regarding which
party was the cheapest cost avoider and therefore should bear the
costs of the accident is necessarily post hoc and probably of uncertain
accuracy. This makes it more difficult for the parties whose activities
contributed to the accidents to identify the cheapest cost avoider in
advance of the accident through negotiation and to reduce the likeli-
hood of the accident or the costs of it.
113. Id. at 150.
114. Id. at 162-64.
115. Id. at 163.
116. Id. at 164.
117. Id. at 161.
118. Id.
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B. Calabresi's Other Goals for Accident Compensation Systems: Loss
Distribution and Administrative Cost Avoidance
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi identifies two other instrumen-
tal goals for an accident compensation system: secondary accident
cost reduction (loss distribution) and tertiary cost avoidance (reduc-
ing the costs of administering the accident compensation system).
This Subpart briefly describes these goals.
Calabresi's second objective in designing an accident compensa-
tion system is to distribute the costs of accidents in a manner that
inflicts "less pain" than if the accident costs were borne solely by the
original victims." 9 The most important means of accomplishing this
objective is to distribute the losses resulting from an accident broadly
across many people. 2 ° Calabresi calls this "interpersonal loss spread-
ing." '' To a single victim of a mass product tort, an injury or disease
is likely to be an unexpected, unmitigated disaster. If, however, her
damages are compensated by insurance or by the manufacturer
(which attempts to pass along the costs of the accidents to other con-
sumers), the impact of the accident on the victim is reduced. Com-
pensation provided to victims of mass products torts from
government-financed social insurance schemes spreads the loss even
more broadly and with lower transaction costs, but may sacrifice any
attempt to provide incentives for product manufacturers to minimize
losses.' 2 2 Calabresi also discusses the "deep pocket notion" that the
costs of accidents will cause less pain and disutility if paid for by peo-
ple who will suffer less "social and economic dislocations as a result of
bearing them, usually thought to be the wealthy."123
Calabresi's third objective is to reduce the costs of administering
any accident compensation system. He notes that the traditional fault-
based tort system is inefficient because it relies upon case-by-case de-
terminations.124 His argument is buttressed by the findings of a 1986
study by the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil Justice showing that
cumulatively the transaction costs involved in tort litigation exceed
the compensation received by victims.'2 5
119. Id. at 39-42.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 37.
122. See id. at 43-44 ("[P]erfect systems of secondary cost avoidance, if they give poor
primary cost avoidance, may be totally unacceptable.").
123. Id. at 40.
124. Id. at 286-87.
125. KAKALIK & PACE, supra note 31, at vi-viii. As Kakalik and Pace report:
We estimate that the total expenditure nationwide for tort litigation termi-
nated in state and federal courts of general jurisdiction in 1985 was between $29
633
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C. Calabresi's Criticism of Typical Features of Alternative Accident
Compensation Systems
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi is careful not to recommend
any particular accident compensation system to the exclusion of
others. 12 6 He does take aim, however, at two features that have be-
come typical of alternative no-fault compensation systems.
First, most no-fault alternative compensation systems, including
both of the eight-hundred-pound gorillas of no-fault workers' com-
pensation and automobile no-fault, generally either prevent claimants
from recovering for losses other than economic losses or restrict eco-
nomic losses to those within limits specified by statute or regula-
tion.'2 7 Historically and politically, limiting recovery to economic
damages was a tradeoff for enabling claimants to recover without a
showing of fault on the injurer's part and for eliminating affirmative
defenses based upon the victim's own conduct. 128
For Calabresi, primary accident cost avoidance is, at a minimum,
first among equals as the goal of an accident compensation system.
He argues that not allowing the victim to recover pain and suffering
or other non-economic damages means that the injured party bears
this portion of the costs of the accident. 129 An injurer who may have
billion and $36 billion. These expenditures .. . include compensation paid to
plaintiffs, legal fees and related expenses for both plaintiffs and defendants, in-
surance company claims-processing costs for claims in suit, the value of litigants'
time spent, and the costs of operating the court system for these cases.
Of the $29 to $36 billion, an estimated $16 to $19 billion was spent for the various
costs of the tort litigation system, not including the net compensation paid to
plaintiffs.
Id. at vi-vii.
126. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 14-15.
127. For a discussion of no-fault workers' compensation statutes, see Spangler, Jennings &
Dougherty P.C. v. Indiana Ins. Co., 729 N.E.2d 117, 121 (Ind. 2000) (describing the Indiana
workers' compensation system's limitation on recovery for non-economic losses), and
Turney v. Werner Enters., Inc., 618 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Neb. 2000) (noting that under Ne-
braska workers' compensation law, "pain and suffering" is not compensable as a separate
element of damages). On the purpose, structure, and limitations of workers' compensa-
tion statutory schemes, see 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMINGJAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE
LAw OF TORTS § 11.2 (2d ed. 1986).
For a discussion of automobile no-fault systems, see Licari v. Elliot, 441 N.E.2d 1088,
1090 (N.Y. 1982) (discussing the New York no-fault insurance system, under which plain-
tiffs may not recover non-economic losses, i.e., "pain and suffering," unless the injury
meets the statutory definition of a "serious injury"). See generally STEPHEN J. CARROLL &
JAMES S. KAKALIK, No-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTrVE 4-7 (RAND Inst.
for Civil Justice, Doc. No. R-4019/1-1CJ, 1991).
128. Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensa-
tion Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 800 (1982).
129. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 205-06.
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been the cheapest cost avoider therefore does not need to consider
these damages when it decides whether to limit or restrict its accident-
causing behavior. Any alternative compensation system that compen-
sates the victim only for economic losses therefore undermines Cala-
bresi's goal of primary accident cost avoidance.
The second feature of some alternative no-fault compensation
systems that Calabresi criticizes is full or partial government funding
or subsidization of such systems.' 3 ° For example, the federally spon-
sored compensation system established by the Black Lung Benefits
Act' is funded in part by general tax revenues.132 Again, Calabresi
would argue that the externalization of costs resulting from funding
the covered injuries with general tax revenues reduces the primary
accident cost avoidance for the injuring parties. 133
Both of Calabresi's arguments, of course, assume that the imposi-
tion of financial responsibility on injuring parties in fact plays a mean-
ingful role in discouraging injury-producing activities. If the goal of
reducing primary accident costs is a largely futile one, this goal be-
comes relatively less important in designing an accident compensa-
tion system than other goals. Calabresi himself acknowledges that
" [i]f primary accident cost avoidance were not a goal, .. . the compen-
sation aim could very easily be discussed in terms of its ideal solu-
tion-a system of general social insurance. 134
IV. LIABILITY, Loss AVOIDANCE, AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME
Mass products torts in which the victim manifests a latent disease
many years after exposure to the toxic product-or even shortly after
exposure to the product but many decades after the manufacture and
130. Id. at 6-7, 10-13, 284, 311.
131. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000). See generally Allen R. Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The
Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 665 (1989).
132. Although the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund is financed by an excise tax on coal
producers, the Fund is authorized to borrow funds from the U.S. Treasury to make up for
shortfalls in excise tax revenues. See Prunty & Solomons, supra note 131, at 669 n.9 (citing
26 U.S.C. §§ 4121, 9501 (2000)). As of 2004, the Fund owed $7.7 billion to Treasury.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., Section 15-Other Programs, in 2004
GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 15-145 (Comm. Print 2004), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/greenbook2003/Sectionl5merge.pdf.
On funding of alternative accident compensation systems, see Stephen D. Sugarman,
Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 628-33 (1985). For a thorough discussion of
the design and operation of such a system, see Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident Coin-
pensation: Policy and Politics in New Zealand, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404 (2000).
133. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 6-7, 284, 311.
134. Id. at 37.
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distribution of the product, such as in the case of childhood lead
poisoning-pose particular challenges for the idea that tort liability
can deter harmful behavior and lead to loss minimization. Asbestosis
and other asbestos-related diseases typically manifest themselves in
persons who have had occupational exposure to asbestos within fif-
teen to thirty-five years.13 5 For those who have had only environmen-
tal exposure, the latency period may be greater than forty years. 131
Similarly, cancer resulting from smoking may have a latency period of
as many as thirty years. 37 The time lag between the manufacture and
distribution of a product and the onset of a disease caused by the
product often is greatest, however, in the case of childhood lead
poisoning. Lead-based paint manufactured as far back as the early
decades of the twentieth century remains a leading cause of child-
hood lead poisoning.' Among these three products, only cigarettes
continue to be manufactured and sold today.
In this Part, I question whether a liability judgment against manu-
facturers of products that are no longer sold, such as asbestos or lead
paint, at a time two, three, or even twelve decades after the distribu-
tion of their products, significantly encourages primary accident cost
reduction. I argue that the typical corporate decisionmaker making
decisions about her employer's potentially harm-producing behav-
ior-whether to market a product, how much to invest in product-
safety testing, and what safety enhancements should be included in
the product-likely does not give much weight to the prospect of a
liability judgment many decades into the future. If the disease-causing
product continues to be manufactured, such as in the case of ciga-
rettes, obviously the prospect of future liability may tend to encourage
the withdrawal of the product from the market or other changes de-
signed to reduce the incidence of future latent diseases caused by the
continued manufacture of the product. Such liability might have
some impact on the manufacturer's subsequent distribution of other
products that cause latent diseases, or on the conduct of other manu-
facturers, but, as discussed below, even this deterrent impact is likely
to be less than one might expect.
135. Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Weinstein,J.).
136. Id.
137. Lawrence S. Engel et al., Population Attributable Risks of Esophageal and Gastric Can-
cers, 95J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1404, 1411 (2003).
138. See PmSIDEr's TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 22 tbl.4 (demonstrating that more
than 95% of lead paint currently posing potential health risks was applied before 1960,
with 49% having been applied between 1914 and 1923).
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A variety of factors combine to substantially reduce the loss mini-
mization effects of manufacturer liability for damages caused by latent
diseases that do not manifest themselves until decades after the manu-
facture or distribution of the disease-causing product. These factors
include:
1. inherent psychological tendencies and economic incen-
tives that cause manufacturers to discount future liabili-
ties, including
a. the inherent human tendency to make decisions based
upon time horizons measured in years, not decades;
and
b. the economic logic of discounting contingent liabili-
ties that would not be faced until the distant future;
2. the career prospects of corporate decisionmakers that de-
pend upon short-term and not long-term results;
3. the inability to project how changes in both the cultural
perceptions of the acceptability of manufacturers' con-
duct and in the substantive law governing products liabil-
ity will affect liabilities in the distant future; and
4. the use of some types of insurance policies in the past that
sometimes shifted the liability risks of unforeseen latent
diseases from the manufacturer to the insurer.
Felstiner and Siegelman have reached the same general conclu-
sion about the impact of the passage of time on the ability of any
accident compensation system to minimize losses: "latent injuries in-
troduce empirical complications that overwhelm the assumptions on
which the deterrent effect of tort compensation found in neoclassical
economic theory is based." '139
A. Inherent Psychological Tendencies and Economic Incentives That Result
in the Discounting of Future Liabilities
Psychological studies suggest an inherent human tendency to dis-
count future liabilities. This human element plays a strong role in
assessing the potential impact of corporate liability for diseases mani-
festing themselves decades into the future, because formal business
and economic models often cannot deal with the multiple uncertain-
ties necessary for economic forecasting beyond a few years.
140
139. W.L.F. Felstiner & Peter Siegelman, Neoclassical Difficulties: Tort Deterrence for Latent
Injuries, 11 LAw & PoL'x 309, 309 (1989).
140. See Ola Svenson, Time Perception and Long-Term Risks, 22 INFOR. J. 196, 197 (1984)
(noting that "the ultimate source of models of forecasting and predictions about the future
is human," and that "formal models are not valid with the multitude of uncertainties associ-
ated with predictions in the distant future").
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Boniecki has concluded that "10-15 years seems the most distant prac-
tical horizon" that individuals see as related to their own life exper-
iences.' 4 1 Other social scientists have found that research subjects
regarded events occurring years into the future as substantially less
important than current events.1 4 ' These studies suggest that human
factors make it less likely that liability imposed at TL (time of imposi-
tion of liability) will affect decisions made at TD (time of the initial
distribution of the product).
Further, in strictly economic terms, ignoring long-term liabili-
ties-or at least paying little attention to them-may be rational and
profit maximizing for the manufacturer. From the manufacturer's ec-
onomic perspective, the deferral of any liability resulting from distri-
bution of a mass product for a forty-year period is the next best thing
to never having to pay the liability. For example, the present dis-
counted value 43 of a $1 million liability payable forty years in the fu-
ture is only $452,890.' Deferral of liability benefits the
manufacturer even more when the discount rate is set at a higher
level. In the 1980s, Professor Henderson concluded that "high dis-
count rates... play[ed] an especially significant role" in encouraging
141. George Boniecki, What Are the Limits to Man's Time and Space Perspectives? Toward a
Definition of a Realistic Planning Horizon, 17 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 161, 174
(1980); see also Gerjo Kok, The Further Away, the Less Serious: Effect of Temporal Distance on
Perceived Value and Probability of a Future Event, 52 PSYCHOL. REP. 531, 534 (1983) (" [P] eople
tend to underestimate the disadvantages of long-term behavior . . . [as] a result of an
underestimation of the severity of a consequence: the further away, the less serious.").
142. See Ulf Lundberg et al., Involvement in Four Future Events as a Function of Temporal
Distance, 16 SCANDANAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 2 (1975) (demonstrating that emotional involve-
ment of subjects in future events with higher estimates of event probability decreased
slowly as the time until the anticipated event increased to twenty years, and then rapidly
approached zero; the emotional involvement of subjects estimating lower probability of
future events tended to decrease rapidly in nearest decades and then slowly approach an
asymptotic value).
143. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 615 (10th ed. 1976). This classic economics
textbook explains how the decisionmaker should determine the present discounted value
of the amount of the liability to be paid in the future:
To figure out the value today of $1 payable t years from now, ask yourself how
much must be invested today at compound interest to grow into $1 at the end of t
years. Now we know that at 6 per cent compound interest any principal grows in I
years proportionally to (1 + 0.06)'. Hence, we need only invert this expression to
arrive at the final answer. Therefore the present discounted value of $1 payable t
years from now is only $1/(1 + 0.06). What if the interest rate were 8 per cent?
Replace 0.06 by 0.08.
Id. at 615-16 n.4; see also DAVID THORNDIKE, THORNDIKE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FI-
NANCIAL TABLES § 8-1.4 (4th ed. 2001).
144. Here I use a discount rate of 2%. See Ramirez v. New York City Off-Track Betting
Corp., 112 F.3d 38, 41 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi,J.) (suggesting a discount rate of 2%
per year).
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"manufacturers to engage in patterns of deep play, deferring until to-
morrow changes in product design and offers of settlement that
might ... be implemented today."'
4 5
It is unlikely that most manufacturers knowingly or deliberately
would ignore an epidemic of injuries resulting from exposure to prod-
ucts that cause latent diseases or the consequent legal liability, even if
the epidemic were not projected to occur until forty years into the
future. Despite the arguably rational and profit-maximizing impact of
discounting, it is to be hoped that the corporate decisionmaker is mo-
tivated by other factors, such as a desire to maintain the long-term
reputation of her employer or even the altruistic impulse to avoid
knowing that one's actions or inactions resulted in other human be-
ings suffering from cancer or other latent diseases. Yet principles of
profit maximization arguably produce a corporate culture that dis-
counts any consequences materializing in the distant future, including
legal liabilities resulting from latent diseases. Further, the divergence
between the interests of the corporation itself and the professional
interests of its managers, discussed in the next Subpart, as well as
other factors inherent in the passage of time between product distri-
bution and the onset of product-caused disease, considered in subse-
quent Subparts, unfortunately contribute to a tendency of corporate
decisionmakers to pay insufficient attention to liability risks on the
distant time horizon.
B. The Interests of Corporate Decisionmakers
Obviously, it is corporate executives and managers who make de-
cisions to market products, including those marketed without ade-
quate testing or awareness of health risks. But what influences their
decisions? What is the likely impact on their decisions of the prospect
of possible liability twenty, fifty, or one hundred years later? What
145. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The Imprisonment of
Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 765, 775 (1983). Professor Henderson also observes
that corporate decisionmakers may discount future liabilities because they bank on escap-
ing all or part of the financial responsibility for harms caused by their products through
tort reform or bankruptcy protection. Id. at 776-77. See generally KEVINJ. DELANEY, STRATE-
GIC BANKRUPTCY. How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVAN-
TAGE 172-73 (1992) (discussing how Continental, Manville, and Texaco all utilized
bankruptcy to avoid paying damage awards). Even solvent defendants can take advantage
of the bankruptcy laws. SeeJordan A. Kroop, Toxins-Are-Us: Putting the "Brakes" on Federal
Court Jurisdiction, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2002, at *2-4, available at 2002 ABI JNL. LEXIS
99 (noting that solvent defendants in asbestos cases assert cross-claims against their Chap-
ter 11 debtor co-defendants in order to delay or avoid liability).
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happens when we look inside what Professor Henderson has called
the corporate "black box"?' 4 6
Those who study corporate behavior 47 have reached a conclu-
sion of critical importance to the imposition of liability for latent-dis-
ease-causing products that courts and tort theorists almost universally
have ignored."4 The prospect of liability more than a few years in the
future-indeed the prospect of anything more than a few years in the
future-has little impact on corporate decisionmaking:149
The investment time horizon of utility-maximizing senior
corporate managers tends to be short. Senior corporate
managers tend to have relatively short tenures in their posi-
tions, as such managers often accede to their positions late in
their careers and keep these positions for only a few years.
More junior managers often move from position to position
within the finns (or worse, from firm to firm). Thus, few
managers who invest in long-term research and development
projects will be around to reap any benefits from such
investments. 15 0
Theoretically, of course, the corporate entity should be regarded
as the cheapest cost avoider, the entity in the best position to bribe or
influence the behavior of its management employees so as to reduce
the costs of future latent diseases. 15 1 Further, the economist might
146. See Henderson, supra note 145, at 769 (describing and questioning the "black box"
model of corporate decisionmaking, in which the interests of corporate managers and
manufacturing firms are perfectly congruent).
147. The general topic of "agency problems" in the corporate context, that is, the possi-
ble conflict of interests between managers and their firms, obviously is beyond the scope of
this Article. For a discussion of the relationship between managers and their firms, see
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197 (1984).
148. Felstiner and Siegelman are the most notable exception to this statement. See Fel-
stiner & Siegelman, supra note 139, at 310 (observing that "managers confronted by uncer-
tainty often seek personal goals at the expense of organizational ones").
149. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Impli-
cations for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REv. 137, 140 (1991)
("Investors and corporate decisionmakers" must make decisions to satisfy "[tihe invest-
ment markets.. . [which] are largely driven by short-term forces."); Henderson, supra note
145, at 782 ("The decision that is best for the manager may not be best for the firm, but to
the extent that managers can advance their own interests and avoid scrutiny, that circum-
stance will not affect their decisions.").
150. Steven S. Cherensky, Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate R&D Spending: An Agency
Cost Model, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HiGH TECH. LJ. 299, 328 (1994) (footnotes
omitted).
151. I am indebted to the late Ryan Easley, a 2004 graduate of the University of Mary-
land School of Law and a student in my Spring 2004 Advanced Torts seminar, for this
insight. Tragically, both Ryan and Melanie Easley, married only a few months earlier, were
killed in a car accident in December 2004. Ryan had unusual analytic abilities and was well
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argue that market forces in the competitive market for capital would
preclude the apparent discrepancy between the manufacturer's long-
term interests and the manager's more immediate interests, at least if
the future liabilities were known. 15 2 A manufacturer facing large lia-
bility exposure would be at a competitive disadvantage in attracting
equity. This assumes, however, that the presence and extent of the
future liability is understood in the equity markets.
The professional interests of corporate managers probably are
even more focused on the short term when the long-term exposure is
only a possibility-as is always the case with a potential legal liability-
and not a certainty.1 5  Professors Gillette and Krier provide the fol-
lowing illustration:
Imagine, for example, a manager with sufficient resources to
invest in either of two ventures, but not both. The first ven-
ture bears a .1 probability of increasing next year's profits by
$10 million. The second is expected, with the same
probability, to avoid distant losses from injuries by an
amount presendy valued at something more than $10 mil-
lion. A desire for tangible and relatively quick indicia of suc-
cess will incline the manager to pursue the former strategy,
even if the latter has a higher expected value, simply because
the manager can't demonstrate that she triggered a benefit
by arranging that something bad won't eventually happen.
This incentive to pursue tangible gains, rather than to avoid
ethereal losses, may become greater as the relative certainty
of the former increases, notwithstanding that the expected
value of the two options is equal. Suppose that the first ven-
ture in our example is regarded as almost certain to increase
profits by $1 million, while the second venture would avoid
injury losses totaling $100 million were they to materialize,
but the probability of materialization is only .01. The man-
ager will now be even more tempted to pursue the first strat-
egy, because certain and demonstrable gains are likely to
enhance her standing in the firm more than would the tenu-
ous avoidance of losses.1 54
In short, even if the rational, wealth-maximizing decision of a cor-
porate entity would be to eliminate or reduce currently profitable ac-
on his way to becoming an outstanding lawyer. His death is a painful reminder that the
costs of accidents" are far more than dollars.
152. But see Felstiner & Siegelman, supra note 139, at 311 (rebutting this argument).
153. Cf Lundberg et al., supra note 142 (suggesting that lower probability of future
events increases the rate at which subjects discount the significance of future events).
154. Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1027, 1040-41 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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tivities that may result in latent disease in coming decades, it is
unlikely that corporate managers will make that decision, because of
the disparity between their own interests and those of their
employers. 1
55
According to some observers, in recent decades, shareholders of
corporations, particularly institutional investors, have been even more
focused on short-term results than have corporate managers:
The ascendancy, increased activism, and short-term focus of
the institutional investor have significant implications for
this age .... Whatever the perceived vices of management
control, management historically pursued socially beneficial
objectives such as expanding the enterprise, improving pro-
ductivity, and cultivating planning, research, and develop-
ment. In contrast, the new control persons-the
institutional investors-share none of these social goals.' 56
Lipton goes on and decries the focus on short-term profitability rather
than on long-term research.' 57 Belzer has noted the often short-term
nature of corporate ownership and has criticized Superfund liability-
imposed in situations parallel to liability for product-caused latent dis-
eases-for penalizing a group of corporate shareholders, decades af-
ter the corporate decisions that caused toxic contamination:
There is another intergenerational equity issue that arises in
the Superfund program ....
* . .For all publicly traded corporations held liable for site
remediation, the beneficiary capitalists were those who
owned stock at the time these actions occurred. These are
not necessarily the same people and institutions who owned
shares at the time that contamination was discovered thereby
triggering the EPA's cleanup demands, or when stock prices
declined to capitalize the reduced future stream of (dis-
155. Professor Henderson offers modest suggestions for better aligning the interests of
the corporation and its managers in this context, but I am skeptical both that these sugges-
tions would solve the problem and that it would be feasible to enact his suggestions. See
Henderson, supra note 145, at 785-94.
156. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 8-9 (1987) (footnote omitted). Similarly, Roe notes that:
Modern writers blame corporate mismanagement on shareholders, who they
say value short-run profits excessively, to the detriment of the nation. They claim
that managers would take the long-view but are stymied by Wall Street's short-run
goals; companies shun long-term investment, and industry underinvests in re-
search and development.
157. MarkJ. Roe, A Political Theoiy ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10, 13
(1991).
Lipton, supra note 156, at 23.
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counted) profits. Depending on how ancient the hazardous
waste problem, most of the actual beneficiaries could be
dead. Instead of making polluters pay, Superfund imposes
the cost of remediation on those with the misfortune of hav-
ing acquired stock from those who benefited from the pollu-
tion. It is not based on the Polluter Pays Principle, but
rather on the Hot Potato Principle.' 58
In theory at least, corporations often rely on members of boards
of directors to consider the long-term consequences of corporate ac-
tions in a manner that managers and executives, and even short-term
investors, sometimes do not.159 It is possible that a board member
would intervene in the introduction of a new product and insist on
greater product-safety testing or other forms of latent-disease avoid-
ance. In many instances, though, the independent board member
probably lacks knowledge of the possible risks of latent diseases.
Those board members who are most likely to be aware of product
risks likely are "inside" board members16 ° and may, like managers and
shareholders, be more interested in immediate and tangible financial
consequences than in the risks of latent diseases or liability resulting
from such diseases decades in the future. 16 1
C. Changing Law and Cultural Attitudes
In order for any accident compensation system to provide the ap-
propriate incentives for product manufacturers to minimize loss, their
liability exposures must be foreseeable. Yet in the decades between
the activities of a manufacturer that are causally connected to a prod-
uct-caused disease and the manifestation of such disease, the law gov-
erning the manufacturer's liability, the legal climate in which liability
is determined, and the cultural attitudes regarding latent diseases all
158. Richard B. Belzer, Discounting Across Generations: Necessary, Not Suspect, 20 RISK ANAL-
Ysis 779, 788 (2000).
159. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors'Fidu-
ciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 409 (2002). Many states have enacted statutes allowing boards to consider the impact
that corporate decisions may have on constituencies other than shareholders. See id. at
460-64. A substantial number of these statutes, however, apply only in the takeover con-
text. Id. at 463. Additionally, these statutes do not require directors to consider longer-term
interests or broader constituencies. Id.; see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Prac-
tical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992).
160. An "inside" board member typically is one who is also a corporate officer or em-
ployee, or an otherwise affiliated director, such as a banker or attorney who works on
behalf of the corporation. WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 1.14, at 1-52 to 1-53 (7th ed. 2004).
161. See Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corpo-
rate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1237 n.100 (2000).
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may change dramatically. Even if one believes that manufacturers of
asbestos products acted in an ethically culpable and outrageous man-
ner and ought to be held legally accountable for the diseases caused
by their products, it is still fair to recognize that these manufacturers'
behavior can be explained at least in part by a failure to predict such
changes. As Felstiner and Siegelman have observed:
Asbestos company officials in the [U.S.] in the 1930s, 40s and
50s were undeterred from putting consumers and workers in
jeopardy not because they ignored the legal consequences of
their own behavior, but because they did not predict the
changes in legal doctrine and pre-trial practice that would
facilitate the litigation that eventually erupted. 162
The changes in substantive law governing the liability of manufac-
turers of mass products during the last half of the twentieth century
obviously were as dramatic as any changes in American tort law since
the emergence of negligence law during the first half of the nine-
teenth century. In addition, judges became more willing to submit
cases to the jury1 6 3 and damage awards increased substantially in ex-
cess of the rate of inflation. 16 4 The last fifty years also have brought
significant cultural changes that result in injured parties being less
likely to blame illness and disease on "fate" and more likely to seek a
culpable human cause that can be held legally responsible. 165 Per-
haps most importantly in the context of latent diseases caused by mass
162. Felstiner & Siegelman, supra note 139, at 313.
163. See WERNER PFENNIGSTORF & DONALD G. GIFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABIL-
rry LAw AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 36-37
(1991); Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1198-99
(2001) ("The increasing tendency of trial judges, as the twentieth century proceeded, to
submit issues for jury decision rather than to decide them as a matter of law is a testament
to the growing influence of the democratic ethos as negligence law has developed.").
164. See, e.g., W. Kip VIscusI, REFORMING PRODucTs LIABILITY 96 & tbl.5.2 (1991) (exam-
iningjury awards in products liability cases from 1971 to 1988 and finding that in most
years, the rate of increase in awards exceeded the rate of inflation); compare ERIK MOLLER,
TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 16 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Doc. No.
DRU-1222-ICJ, 1995) (reporting results of a study of jury verdicts in fifteen jurisdictions
from 1985 to 1994, which indicated a general increase in award amounts across jurisdic-
tions, with the highest increase, 300%, in Cook County, Illinois), with Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers: U.S. City
Average, at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (Dec. 17, 2004) (showing
a cumulative increase in CPI during same period of time of roughly 40%).
165. See Donald G. Gifford & David J. Nye, Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a Growth
State, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 829, 869 (1987) (noting that injured parties "are less willing to
attribute tragedy to fate, the supernatural, or chance," which is one explanation for the
general increase in litigation); see also Alternatives to the American Judicial System, in No Ac-
CESS TO LAw" ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3, 4-5 (Laura Nader ed., 1980)
(noting that individuals increasingly turn to the state for redress because other mecha-
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products, the link between product exposure and the resulting disease
often was not as clearly understood at the time of the manufacture of
the product as it is today. 166 While it had long been understood that
smoking results in harmful health effects, the strong causal connec-
tion between lung cancer and smoking was not clearly established un-
til the 1950s.1 6 7 The dangers of high-dosage exposure to lead
probably have been known since ancient times,
1 61 but the effects of
low doses of lead on children in terms of loss of intelligence, behavior
disruptions, and physiological changes, were not fully appreciated un-
til decades into the twentieth century.16 9 Fifty or sixty years ago, even
the most astute and prudent corporate decisionmakers and their
counsel probably could not have predicted these changes in scientific
understanding of the effects of exposure to tobacco smoke or lead,
the cultural shifting in blaming behavior, and the changes in the legal
system's handling of claims seeking compensation for latent diseases.
The reflexive response to this argument might be that corpora-
tions and their counsel should anticipate progressive changes in the
nisms of social control, such as public opinion, have less force in today's increasingly frag-
mented, urbanized, and mobile society).
166. This is due in part to a shift in the focus of public health. In the early decades of
the twentieth century, public health was focused on contagious diseases, not on diseases
caused by toxic exposure. See CHRISTIAN WARREN, BRUSH WITH DEATH: A SOCIAL HISTORY 
OF
LEAD POISONING 38-39 (2000).
167. DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATrLE WITH A DEADLY
INDUSTRY 198 (2001); Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 63, at 856. According to Kessler, a
series of medical presentations in December 1953 that demonstrated the link between
smoking and cancer first focused public attention on the dangers of smoking. Until this
time, the link between smoking and cancer had not been acknowledged by the National
Cancer Institute, the U.S. Public Health Service, or many prominent doctors and scientists.
KESSLER, supra, at 198.
168. WARREN, supra note 166, at 20 (noting that the Greek poet and physician Nicander
described the symptoms of acute lead poisoning in the second century B.C.).
169. According to Warren, "[a] t the beginning of the twentieth century, the relative lack
of diagnostic tools meant that only acute, clinical plumbism was accurately diagnosed." Id.
at 14. Public health researchers only "became aware of the true scale of childhood lead
poisoning [in the late 1960s]." Id. at 28. Warren continues, "[a]s late as the early 1950s,
Baltimore's aggressive pediatric lead-screening program defined cases in which the blood-
lead level exceeded 70 gg/dL only as 'possible' lead poisoning." Id. Today, the Centers
for Disease Control notes that "[m]any studies point to a link between BLLs [blood-lead
levels] >=10 gg/dL and harmful health effects, in particular learning disabilities and be-
havior problems." Nat'l Ctr. For Envti. Health, Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention,
Children's Blood Lead Levels in the United States, at http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/re-
search/kidsBLL.htm (last reviewed Oct. 4, 2004). Warren concludes, "[t]he prerequisites
for the discovery of childhood lead-poisoning's epidemic nature were met in the United
States by the 1920s ... [b]ut until the 1970s, the medical and public health communities'
responses remained sluggish, if not moribund." WARREN, supra note 166, at 43.
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law,' 70 generally err on the side of greater avoidance of injury and
disease, and encourage a "safety margin" or "cushion" against future
liability. Neither Calabresi's theory of accident law nor the existing
principles of tort liability, however, typically seek to prevent all injury
or illness resulting from products, and such an approach could lead to
keeping many useful products out of the marketplace, excessive prod-
uct testing, and other unnecessary safety precautions not warranted by
the reduction in accident Costs.171
Changes in the law and legal culture, however, do not invariably
favor the plaintiff. Trends in products liability law during the 1980s
and 1990s generally have been seen as benefiting manufacturers, not
consumers.' 7 2 State legislative "tort reform,"' 73 the unwillingness of
courts to certify classes of injured consumers, 174 and the increased use
of bankruptcy by mass products manufacturers to avoid liability77 all
might have been difficult for corporate counsel and executives or in-
surance actuaries to foresee as late as the 1980s. Similarly, it is diffi-
cult to predict the changes in accident compensation law, legal
process, and blaming behavior that the next generation will bring and
whether these changes will benefit manufacturers or victims of latent
170. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 796 (1983).
171. Contra Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56VAND. L. REv. 653, 747 (2003) ("Cost-justified precaution ... demands too little in the way
of precaution .... ).
172. E.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Prod-
ucts Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 481 (1990).
173. SeeJoseph Sanders & CraigJoyce, "Off to the Races": The 1 980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV. 207, 218-23 (1990) (summarizing legislative efforts to limit
tort liability in forty-eight states between 1985 and 1988).
174. E.g., Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding thatindividual issues raised by cigarette litigation precluded class certification); Castano v. Am.Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a class because of the promi-
nence of individual issues and variations in state law); Barreras Ruiz v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
180 F.R.D. 194, 199 (D.P.R. 1998) (denying class certification because the proposed class
action was not a superior form of adjudication to individual actions and because commonissues of law and fact were not predominant); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 98-99 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (same).
175. E.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 638-39 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirmingthe bankruptcy court's confirmation of the plan of reorganization for Johns-Manville
Corp., which faced significant liabilities from asbestos litigation); In re Fuller-Austin Insula-tion, No. 98-2038-JJF, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18340, at *3-5 (D. Del. Nov. 10, 1998) (finding
that certain parties did not have standing to object to the plan of reorganization underChapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of a company that sought to consolidate all present
and future asbestos claims in a trust); Helen Dewar & Kathleen Day, Senate Approves Bank-
ruptcy Bill; Industry-Sought Overhaul Passes 83-14, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2000, at Al, available at2000 WL 2283515 (noting that gun manufacturers have filed for bankruptcy to avoid liabil-ity arising from tort lawsuits). See generally DELANEY, supra note 145.
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diseases caused by exposure to products that were manufactured one
or two decades ago.
D. The Impact of "Occurrence" and "Claims-Made" Insurance Policies
The time delay between the manufacture and distribution of a
product that causes latent disease and any legal liability that may deter
or regulate a manufacturer's conduct may be affected by the type of
liability insurance that a manufacturer carries. Prior to the mid-1980s,
coverage under most policies insuring against manufacturers' liability
for harm resulting from exposure to their products was triggered by
an "occurrence," defined in a typical policy as "an accident, including
injurious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy pe-
riod, in bodily injury."'7 6 In the mass products/latent diseases context,
courts have reached differing conclusions on the question of which
event is the occurrence triggering coverage. Some courts have held
that the policy in effect at the time of the victim's exposure to the
disease-causing product is the policy at risk,' 77 a few have held that the
insurer providing coverage at the time of the manifestation of disease
provides coverage, 178 and many courts now follow the "triple-trigger"
or "continuous-trigger" approach and hold that any insurer who pro-
vided coverage at any time between the initial exposure of the victim
to the product and the subsequent manifestation of disease is liable to
the manufacturer for indemnification and defense costs.'
79
Under an occurrence policy, the choice among the possible trig-
gers of coverage determines whether it is the insurer or the manufac-
turer-either directly or through increases in the cost of subsequently
purchased insurance policies-that will bear the financial risk result-
ing either from the discovery that a product causes a latent disease
theretofore unknown or from changes in the law and legal culture.
Under an exposure theory, the amount of the policy premium is de-
termined and the premium paid long before the victims' latent dis-
eases manifest themselves. The insurer therefore bears the risk that
176. Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
177. E.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1217, 1223
(6th Cir. 1980), affd on reh'g, 657 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1981) (subscribing to the "exposure
theory" of insurance coverage, under which all insurance carriers that provided coverage
during the period in which the employee was exposed to asbestos are liable).
178. E.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 25 (1st Cir.
1982) (holding that "the operative date for determining which of... several policies...
apply to a given claim ... is the date when the asbestos-related disease became reasonably
capable of medical diagnosis").
179. E.g., Keene, 667 F.2d at 1041; Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974,
995 (N.J. 1994).
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medical science will subsequently determine that the product causes
an unforeseeable latent disease and also bears the risk of pro-plaintiff
developments in the law or legal culture."' 0 Under a manifestation
trigger, the risks of changes in medical understanding or the law in
the time between the victim's exposure to the product and the mani-
festation of his illness would be largely borne by the insured manufac-
turer if the liability insurance industry, as would be expected, excludes
coverage of the product in question or increases the price of such
coverage in response to these intervening developments. Finally,
under the continuous-trigger approach, the risks are shared between
the manufacturer and the insurer. Insurers whose policies cover the
risk of liabilities from latent disease because the exposure took place
during the policy periods will share financial responsibility for the un-
foreseen latent diseases with manufacturers who later purchased poli-
cies covering these liabilities (once the risks of the latent diseases were
known and reflected in the price of coverage), under which coverage
was triggered by the manifestation of the disease.
Courts adopting either an exposure or a continuous-trigger ap-
proach under an occurrence-based policy thus further erode the de-
terrent impact on the manufacturer that otherwise might have
resulted from the imposition of liability. In these situations, it is notjust that a substantial period of time passes before the manufacturer
faces liability. In this situation, the insurer ends up unexpectedly
beaing at least part of the financial risk for a large liability that may
not have been anticipated by either the manufacturer or the insurer
and that was not reflected in the policy premium.
Insurers' unexpected and dramatically large exposure resulting
from asbestos liability led them in 1984 to begin to offer policies on a
"claims-made" basis.18' Claims-made policies provide coverage for
those claims discovered and brought to the attention of the insurer
during the policy term, regardless of when the product was manufac-
tured, when the victim was exposed to the product, or when the vic-
tim's illness first manifested itself.'82  At the current time,
manufacturers that do not appear to have "long-tail" liability risks gen-
erally still can obtain occurrence policies, but those in fields such as
180. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Making Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 399, 406 (1987) [hereinafter Liability Insurance] ("Pricing an occurrence policy under
such circumstances is an exercise in speculation.").
181. Eugene R. Anderson et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for Corporate Counsel, 49 Bus.
LAw. 259, 264-65 (1993); see also Abraham, Liability Insurance, supra note 180, at 406.
182. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw § 65[a], at 531-32 (3d ed.
2002).
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pharmaceuticals, which pose risks of latent diseases, may be forced to
purchase claims-made policies. 18 3 Even a manufacturer whose prod-
ucts pose a long-term risk sometimes can negotiate to obtain an occur-
rence policy if its negotiating leverage is sufficiently great, e.g., a large
corporation with the need for extensive and diverse insurance
coverages.
Under claims-made policies, the risk of a new understanding in
the distant future of a causal connection between exposure to the in-
sured manufacturer's product and disease, as well as changes in the
law and legal climate, are largely shifted to the insured and are not
borne by the insurer.18 4 To the extent that insurers still offer occur-
rence policies to manufacturers whose products posed any risk at all
of downstream latent diseases, it is likely that such policies have in-
cluded what Professor Abraham has called an "unpredictability risk
premium," thus shifting back to the insured at least a portion of the
risk of liability judgments resulting from latent diseases not antici-
pated at the time of product distribution.
185
Even a claims-made policy that places the financial risks for the
subsequent discovery of latent diseases on the insured manufacturer
and not on the insurer, however, does nothing to counteract the fac-
tors discussed above that discourage the manufacturer from giving
much weight to liabilities on the distant time horizon, i.e., the rational
discounting of liabilities that will not occur until decades into the fu-
ture, the human tendency to make decisions premised upon events
occurring in a more proximate time horizon, and the professional
and financial interests of those in the corporate culture that often fo-
cus on short-term outcomes.
E. The Passage of Time and the Effects of Imposing Liability
This Part has argued that imposing liability for the manufacture
of a mass product that has resulted in latent diseases decades after the
distribution of the product is unlikely to affect the manufacturer's
original activities in manufacturing and distributing the product.
What effect, however, might such liability have on encouraging pri-
mary accident cost avoidance by these manufacturers and their peers
in other contexts?
183. E-mail from Professor Kenneth S. Abraham, University of Virginia School 
of Law
(Apr. 13, 2004) (on file with author).
184. Abraham, Liability Insurance, supra note 180, at 406.
185. Id. at 405.
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Most obviously, liability judgments at TL (time of determination
of liability) for latent diseases caused by the product encourage the
manufacturer either to stop continued distribution of the product at
TL or to otherwise avoid further harm by changing the design or com-
position of the product or by providing effective warnings to product
users. The conclusion that liability at TL will not encourage primary
accident cost avoidance applies only to those situations where the
manufacturer already has stopped distribution of the product or al-
ready has taken steps to prevent products currently distributed from
causing latent diseases in the future. This is not an unusual situation,
however. The initial determinations of liability for illnesses caused by
DES,' 8 6 Agent Orange, ' 7 lead-based paint, 88 and many other prod-
ucts occurred after the withdrawal of the product from the market.
Most of the judgments against asbestos manufacturers also occurred
after federal regulators had effectively prohibited the use of asbestos
in its highest-risk, i.e. commercial, applications.' 8 9 Even if the initial
litigation against the manufacturer of a disease-causing product oc-
curred while the product was still on the market, this litigation, to-
gether with the publicity generated by the litigation and resulting
regulatory actions, generally results in the removal of the product
from the market.' 90 The threat of subsequent liability judgments obvi-
ously influences this decision, but the inherent nature of "mass" torts,
e.g., litigation against manufacturers of asbestos products, is such that
the degree of legal exposure projected generally is far greater than
186. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. The manufacture of DES was discon-tinued in 1971 when the Food and Drug Administration banned its use after studies linked
the drug to adenocarcinoma. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 558 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)(Weinstein,J.). Claims against the manufacturers began in the mid-1970s, but were unsuc-
cessful until the development of market share liability enabled claimants to circumvent
their inability to identify the manufacturer of the specific product that caused harm to anyparticular plaintiff. See MEYERs, supra note 49, at 215-30.
187. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. The Department of Defense sus-pended use of Agent Orange in 1970. Ellen Tannenbaum, Note, The Pratt-Weinstein Ap-proach to Mass Tort Litigation, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 459 (1986). The first case was not filed
until 1978. Id. at 460.
188. Manufacturers of lead pigment or lead-based paint, which was banned by federallaw in 1978, have yet to be held liable for childhood lead poisoning. See supra notes 71-76
and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 5, 33-44 and infra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.190. For example, silicon gel breast implants were taken off the market in 1992 by theFDA except for reconstructive (as opposed to cosmetic) purposes or for extremely limited
clinical trials. Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination of theSilicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 973, 980-81 (1993). The FDA
explicitly stated that the ban was due to information uncovered in some of the initial litiga-tion. Id. at 981. However, the bulk of the litigation did not come until after the implants
had been taken off the market. See ANGELL, supra note 57, at 69-89.
[VOL. 64:613
2005] LATENT DISEASES RESULTING FROM MASS PRODUCTS 651
that probably necessary to encourage the manufacturer to withdraw
the product from the market.1 91
One would assume that the imposition of liability also would in-
fluence the product manufacturer, and other manufacturers in the
industry, when they make decisions in the future about the distribu-
tion of other products. The factors analyzed in this Part, however,
suggest that the mere imposition of financial liability at TL, decades
after the decisions are made about product safety and product distri-
bution, may not significantly encourage either the same product man-
ufacturer or its peers to take care to avoid similar liabilities in the
future. Imposition of liability probably does make corporate deci-
sionmakers more conscious of liabilities that could occur in the dis-
tant future, 19 2 but it is still likely that the corporate manager would
discount the effects of such liabilities. Further, while corporate cul-
tures today may encourage greater sensitivity to the harms caused by
toxic products, many executives probably remain more concerned
about the next quarter's numbers and the impact of such short-term
feedback on their careers than they are about the prospect of corpo-
rate liabilities or the health problems-regardless of their severity-
experienced by those exposed to their products at a point in the dis-
tant future long after the executives' retirements or deaths.
F. Time and the Determination of the Cheapest Cost Avoider
Law and economics and tort theorists often overlook time, the
fourth dimension. As described in this Subpart, the passage of time
between TA (the time of the acts that are a contributing cause of the
accident or illness) and TL (the time of liability) is ignored.
1 9 3 If the
only goal is to minimize the costs of accidents or latent diseases, the
191. See, e.g., supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (examining the costs associated
with asbestos litigation).
192. The nature of latent diseases often means that the manufacturer 
does not know
whether any latent diseases caused by exposure to its products will occur within 
a couple of
years, only after several decades, or never, but it would be rational for the 
manufacturer to
assume that at least some of the risks of latent diseases are risks that would 
not manifest
themselves until decades into the future.
193. In a 1983 commentary, in Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications for Prod-
uct Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1983), Calabresi considered the passage of time in a
different context. See Guido Calabresi, Commentary, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 939 (1983). He
asked whether, in assessing a party's conduct under a cost-benefit analysis, the situation
should be viewed retrospectively at the time of the accident (the "hindsight test") or pro-
spectively as of the time of the party's conduct (the "prospective test"). Id. at 941. Cala-
bresi's focus was on a different issue-which party should bear the risk of harm from
unknowable risks-rather than on the frustration of the effectiveness of liability in 
mini-
mizing losses that result merely from the passage of a significant period of time. Id.
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determination of which party is the cheapest cost avoider should be
made at TA and not TL.' 9 4 In the latent disease context, however, the
TA may be different for various actors who contribute to the harm.
For instance, the determination of the cheapest cost avoider 95 may
turn upon the point in time at which this determination is made. For
example, the contributing causes of childhood lead poisoning may in-
clude the manufacturer's distribution of a lead-based paint in 1920
and the landlord's allowing the paint to deteriorate during the 1990s.
The effects of the passage of time on the determination of the cheap-
est cost avoider will be considered further in Part VI.
V. THE INABILITY TO ASSESS THE COSTS OF LATENT DISEASES TO THE
Acrrvry CAUSING THE HARM
For primary accident cost avoidance to occur with any precision,
the damages resulting from latent diseases due to exposure to mass
products must be assessed to the activity causing the harm. In reality,
this is probably impossible to accomplish in most cases. The obstacle
is a somewhat different-and more difficult-one than the problem
addressed by market share liability in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories'96 or
by Calabresi's argument in The Costs of Accidents that actors causing
injuries should be held liable even if the victims cannot identify the
particular actor who caused their harm. 97 Even if we were willing to
forgo the traditional requirement that the victim must identify the
particular tortfeasor causing her harm, there is a "second generation"
problem with multiple and indeterminate defendants: If primary acci-
dent cost avoidance is to be achieved, the costs of accidents must in
actuality be borne at least by the activity causing the harm, even if they
194. Calabresi implicitly reached the opposite conclusion on this question, but he did soin the distinguishable context of which party should bear the risk of harm from unknow-
able risks. He concludes that the "entrepreneur" should bear this risk because "[i]n an
entrepreneurial society like ours, those who choose to be entrepreneurs can properly be
assumed to be less risk-averse than others." Id. His argument seems to be one based more
on fairness than on primary accident cost avoidance, though it can be argued that the "less
risk-averse" nature of entrepreneurs when compared with that of victims requires that in a
close case, the costs of accidents should be placed on entrepreneurs in order to deter those
more likely to engage in accident-causing behavior. Id. Again, his conclusion does not
address the issue considered here, the likely inability of the imposition of liability decadeslater to affect the manufacturer's conduct at the time of the manufacture and distribution
of a product.
195. See supra notes 105-118 and accompanying text (discussing Calabresi's analysis of
the cheapest cost avoider); infra Part VI (discussing the determination of the cheapest cost
avoider in various areas of mass torts).
196. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); see infra notes 215-224 and accompanying text (discussing
market share liability).
197. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 297-99.
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cannot be assessed against the specific actor causing the harm. My
argument is somewhat complex, so let us begin with the comparatively
simple first-generation problem of whether the victim should be able
to recover if she cannot identify the particular actor causing her harm.
A. The Inability to Identify the Actor Causing the Disease
1. Latent Diseases Resulting from Products Manufactured by Multiple
or Indeterminate Firms.-In many, perhaps most, examples of latent dis-
eases, the injured party is not able to identify the particular firm that
manufactured the product causing her harm. Numerous firms manu-
facture products that are fungible or essentially so, and it is often im-
possible for the injured party to identify the manufacturer of the
product that caused her harm because she is asked to do so years after
she purchased or consumed the product. The facts of the widely
known opinion in Sindell illustrate the issue. Plaintiff sued on behalf
of herself and other similarly situated women suffering from cancer-
ous and pre-cancerous growths that she alleged resulted from their
mothers' consumption, at least ten or twelve years earlier, of diethyl-
stilbestrol (DES), a synthetic estrogen compound intended to prevent
miscarriages in pregnant women.1 98 Plaintiff lacked the means to
identify which pharmaceutical company manufactured the DES con-
sumed by her mother, because eleven drug companies named in the
complaint and scores of additional drug companies used an identical
chemical formula for the drug.1 99 The plaintiff admitted that she
could not identify which company had manufactured the drug re-
sponsible for her injury, and accordingly, the trial court dismissed the
complaint.2 0 0 Claimants face similar obstacles in cases involving expo-
sure to a wide variety of products that are fungible or similar, particu-
larly when the delayed onset of harm and the passage of time have
made identification of the specific manufacturer responsible for the
disease impossible. °1 The claimant's ability to recover for his injury
198. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
199. Id. at 926.
200. Id.
201. In another DES opinion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that
"[i]dentification of the party responsible for causing injury to another is a longstanding
prerequisite" for liability. Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 188 (Mass. 1982). The
court reasoned that this requirement "separates wrongdoers from innocent actors, and
also ensures that wrongdoers are held liable only for the harm that they have caused." Id.
Many courts have recognized the dilemma caused by the traditional requirement that the
victim identify the specific manufacturer that produced the fungible product that caused
her disease. For example, in Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., the Hawaii Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that unless it departed from traditional rules of causation, "innocent plaintiffs
would be left without a remedy." 823 P.2d 717, 724 (Haw. 1991).
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has been denied because of his inability to prove which specific defen-
dant manufactured the product in cases of exposure to Agent Or-
ange, 20 2 asbestos insulation,2 3 lead pigment,2 4 and cigarettes. 2 5
2. Market Share Liability and Other Forms of Collective Liability for
Latent Diseases.-Despite the traditional requirement that a claimant
identify the specific product manufacturer whose product caused her
harm, manufacturers of mass products may be held liable without
proof of specific identification on legal theories including civil con-
spiracy206 or concert of action, 20 7 alternative liability, 208 enterprise or
202. E.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (Weinstein, J.) (denying recovery to plaintiffs who opted-out of a class action settle-
ment and were unable to prove that their diseases resulted from exposure to Agent Orange
or that "any particular defendant produced the Agent Orange to which he may have been
exposed").
203. E.g., Bateman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1986)
(affirming the dismissal of an asbestos case in which the plaintiffs were unable to identify
either the specific products that caused their diseases or any of the manufacturers of the
products).
204. E.g., Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 175 (Pa. 1997) (affirming sum-
mary judgment because of plaintiffs' inability to identify the manufacturer of the lead
pigment).
205. E.g., Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515 (D.N.J. 2002) (granting
summary judgment in a suit against a tobacco company because plaintiff "provided insuffi-
cient evidence that decedent was exposed to [the defendant's] product").
206. E.g., Wright v. Brooke Group Ltd., 114 F. Supp. 2d 797 (N.D. Iowa 2000). In
Wright, plaintiffs sued multiple cigarette manufacturers, alleging "civil conspiracy," among
other torts. Id at 803. They alleged that the defendants were "acting in concert.., to
produce an unreasonably dangerous product-cigarettes-an underlying wrong for which
they could be held strictly liable." Id. at 837. The court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the civil conspiracy claim. Id. at 838; see also Hollar v. Philip Morris Inc., 43 F. Supp.
2d 794, 810 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss a claim that the
defendant cigarette manufacturers "conspired and acted in concert to deprive the public
and consumers of cigarettes of the medical and scientific data and further misrepresented
the adverse health effects of cigarettes"); In reAsbestos Litig., 679 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss a civil conspiracy claim in an asbestos
case where plaintiff alleged cooperation between manufacturers to misrepresent and con-
ceal "the dangerous nature of the product").
207. E.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (deny-
ing a motion to dismiss concert of action claims against manufacturers of asbestos prod-
ucts); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 289 N.W.2d 20, 25, 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that
under a concert of action claim a defendant manufacturer may be "liable for the harm
caused by his fellows because all acted jointly" and holding that plaintiffs adequately stated
a cause of action), affjd, 343 N.W.2d 164 (Mich. 1984).
208. E.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1988). In Menne, the plain-
tiff developed mesothelioma after a forty-year history of exposure to asbestos products as a
pipefitter and plumbing and heating contractor. Id. at 1456. Plaintiff proved that he had
been exposed to asbestos products manufactured by each of the defendants, but could not
prove that exposure to any particular defendant's product was a substantial cause of his
disease, a requirement under Nebraska law. Id. at 1461-62. Under these circumstances,
the court held that it was appropriate to shift the burden to the defendants "to prove the
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industry-wide liability,20 9 and market share liability. 2 1' Each of these
theories for holding manufacturers of mass products liable, however,
has been applied only in cases with specific (and generally unusual)
circumstances. 21  Even if courts impose liability on mass products
manufacturers collectively, with the exception of market share liabil-
ity, such liability is joint and several.2 1 2 When courts hold multiple or
indeterminate manufacturers jointly and severally liable, the critical
issue for primary accident cost avoidance becomes how the courts will
divide financial responsibility among the manufacturers, 21 3 or per-
exposure [from their respective products] was unlikely to have been frequent or long
enough to be a substantial factor in causing Menne's mesothelioma." Id. at 1468. The
court acknowledged that "[w ] here a defendant lacks evidence as to the frequency or dura-
tion of exposure, the burden shift may well result in a finding that the defendant is a cause
of the harm." Id. at 1469.
209. E.g., Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(Weinstein, J.). Judge Weinstein denied a motion to dismiss by six manufacturers of blast-
ing caps and their trade association who plaintiffs alleged were jointly and severally liable
on a theory of "enterprise liability" (subsequent courts more often have referred to this
theory of liability as "industry-wide liability") for damages to children resulting from eigh-
teen separate accidents on the grounds that defendants had cooperated in a safety pro-
gram through a trade association, and acting either jointly or in a parallel fashion, had
adopted common safety features. Id. at 358-59.
210. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). Market share liability is
discussed infta, at notes 215-224 and accompanying text.
211. For example, holding manufacturers liable under a theory of civil conspiracy re-
quires an agreement, at least a tacit one, among manufacturers to commit a tortious or
wrongful act. Wright, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 836. As a practical matter, courts generally have
rejected the application of alternative liability to mass products torts unless the number of
possible manufacturers is very small and all of them are before the court. The traditional
theory of alternative liability requires that (1) the conduct of defendants be simultaneous
in time or nearly so; (2) the plaintiff's injury result from the conduct of only one
tortfeasor; and (3) all possible tortfeasors be joined as defendants. Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 314 n.35 (5th Cir. 1998). Mass products torts cases generally fail
to meet these requirements. E.g., id.; Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 38 F.3d 510, 512-13 (10th
Cir. 1994); City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 128 (3d Cir. 1993); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. h (1965). Following its introduction
in Judge Weinstein's promising opinion in Hal4 enterprise or industry-wide liability has
been virtually universally rejected by the courts. E.g., Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004, 1017-18 (D.S.C. 1981) (refusing to apply enterprise liability and describing it as "re-
pugnant to the most basic tenets of tort law").
212. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 822-23 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (Weinstein, J.) (alternative liability resulting in joint and several liability); Hall, 345
F. Supp. at 376-78 (enterprise liability resulting in joint and several liability); Abe4 289
N.W.2d at 25 (concert of action resulting in joint and several liability).
213. See, e.g., Cimino, 151 F.3d at 327-28 (discussing allocation of liability shares among
defendants in an asbestos suit when one of the defendants declared bankruptcy after the
verdicts were returned).
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haps more accurately, how financial liability will be divided among the
manufacturers' insurers.214
The distribution of financial liability for mass products torts also
lies at the heart of the tantalizing concept of market share liability,
which was first accepted by the court in Sindell. Market share liability
has inspired considerable academic attention,2 1 despite its virtually
universal subsequent rejection by the courts2 6 in cases other than
those against DES manufacturers. 21 7 The basic principle of market
share liability is that "l[e] ach defendant will be held liable for the pro-
portion of the judgment represented by its share of that market unless
it demonstrates that it could not have made the product which caused
plaintiffs injuries."218 This theory, claimed the California Supreme
Court in Sindell, results in each manufacturer's liability reflecting "the
injuries caused by its own products." 219 In Sindell, the court justified
its adoption of this theory on the basis of Calabresian concepts-pri-
mary cost avoidance and the determination of the cheapest cost
avoider:
The manufacturer is in the best position to discover and
guard against defects in its products and to warn of harmful
effects; thus, holding it liable for defects and failure to warn
of harmful effects will provide an incentive to product
safety. 2
20
214. See, e.g., In reAsbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, No. 1072, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 24, 1990), reprinted in 4 MICHAEL DORE, L.Aw OF Toxic TORTS app. 31C (2003);
Jonathan Dahl, Case of Five Asbestos Firms vs. Insurers over Huge Claims Goes to Trial Monday,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1985, available at 1985 WL-WSJ 240673.
215. See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34
VAND. L. REv. 1623 (1981); Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on
the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713 (1982).
216. E.g., Griffin v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 964 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (benzidine
congener dyes); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511 (NJ. 1989) (DPT vaccine);
Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987) (asbestos products
generally). Contra Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (Ct. App. 1992)
(asbestos brake pads); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991) (blood
plasma) .
217. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.
2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). Contra Pay-
ton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982).
218. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 936. There is no direct evidence that the California Supreme Court was rely-
ing upon the analysis presented in The Costs of Accidents. It is more likely that it relied upon
Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441
(Cal. 1944), which appears to have substantially influenced the writing of The Costs of
Accidents.
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Further, the opinion reflects the concept of secondary cost avoidance
that Calabresi developed in The Costs of Accidents:
From a broader policy standpoint, defendants are better able
to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a
defective product. As was said by Justice Traynor in Escola,
"[t] he cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be
an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business." '21
Finally, the court stated that "as between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury."
222
While this statement superficially reflects notions of corrective justice,
it also can be seen as a primitive articulation of the concept of cheap-
est cost avoider.
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi comes down squarely on the
side of collective responsibility for injuries caused by multiple or inde-
terminate defendants, including, presumably, manufacturers of mass
products that are fungible or nearly so:
For centuries society has seemed to accept the notion that
justice required a one-to-one relationship between the party
that injures and the party that is injured ....
There is, of course, no logical necessity for linking our treat-
ment of victims, individually or as a group, to our treatment
of injurers, individually or as a group.223
Calabresi thus has separated the objectives of deterring harmful
conduct by the injurer and compensating the victim. The link be-
tween the goals of primary accident cost reduction and secondary ac-
cident cost reduction is severed. Therefore, it is no longer a
requirement that the amount that should be paid by the injurer to
satisfy the goal of primary accident cost reduction is necessarily
equivalent to the amount needed to compensate the injured party.
224
221. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (quoting Escola, 150 P.2d at 441).
222. Id.
223. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 297.
224. Id. at 302-03. When Calabresi writes, "Today accidents must be viewed not as inci-
dental events linking one victim with one injurer, but as a more general societal problem,"
id. at 307-08, he follows in a journey transforming our understanding of tort liability that
Oliver Wendell Holmes began when he wrote The Path of the Laur.
Our law of torts comes from the old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs ....
But the torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day are mainly the incidents
of certain well known businesses. They are injuries to person or property by rail-
roads, factories, and the like. The liability for them is estimated, and sooner or
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3. The Frequent Inability to Assess Individual Firms' Shares of Liabil-
ity.-Any accident compensation system that provides for collective re-
sponsibility of multiple manufacturers of fungible or nearly fungible
mass products-assuming that it is difficult or impossible to distin-
guish the products of one manufacturer from another-inevitably
must address the issue of how financial responsibility for liabilities will
be divided among them. Courts may confront this issue either initially
in the plaintiff's action seeking liability against manufacturers of mass
products, 2 25 or as a part of a contribution action brought by one man-
ufacturer against another. This problem is not one that can be
avoided under Calabresi's alternative framework for handling the
costs of accidents.
The pragmatic problem of ascertaining market shares-or any
other equitable basis for distributing the costs of mass products torts
among manufacturers of fungible or similar products-is more than a
matter of tweaking the details of liability, particularly when decades
have passed since the time of the manufacture or distribution of the
products. Consider, for example, Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass'n,
where a child suffering from childhood lead poisoning, acting
through her guardian, sued substantially all manufacturers that had
produced lead pigment used in residential house paint between 1870
and 1977.226 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the difficul-
ties of allocating liability among the manufacturers to be insurmount-
able.2 27 Presumably the house had been painted many times between
1870 (the date of its initial construction) and 1977 (when, according
to the court, the manufacture of paint containing lead pigment
ceased). No records were available to determine when the house had
been painted, which paint manufacturers' products were used, or
which pigment manufacturer's pigment was contained in any given
paint.2 2 8 Further, the chemical composition of paint varied widely.2 29
Finally, as the court noted, the "bioavailablility" of the lead, that is, its
later goes into the price paid by the public. The public really pays the damages,
and the question of liability, if pressed far enough, is really the question how far it
is desirable that the public should insure the safety of those whose work it uses.
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 467 (1897).
225. This occurs in two very different contexts, either when the court employs market
share analysis, discussed in the previous Section, or when a jurisdiction has adopted several
or proportionate liability. E.g., In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 750 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (applying New York's proportionate liability scheme, which limits a
joint tortfeasor's liability for non-economic losses to its proportionate share, provided that
the tortfeasor is 50% or less at fault, to asbestos manufacturers).
226. 690 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. 1997).
227. Id. at 173.
228. Id. at 171.
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propensity to be internalized by the body and absorbed by the blood-
stream, varied from one product to another, even when the lead con-
tent was identical.23° In these circumstances, the court determined
that any application of market share liability "would lead to a distor-
tion of liability which would be so gross as to make determinations of
culpability arbitrary and unfair.
231
While the determination of market shares of pigment manufac-
turers decades ago may be particularly challenging, the difficulty of
determining market shares of manufacturers of fungible or similar
products is endemic. 23 2 Cases against manufacturers of DES are ones
in which it is uniquely easy to determine market shares: (1) all DES
was manufactured according to an identical formula approved by the
FDA,233 and (2) the DES that resulted in injury to any particular plain-
tiff was consumed by her mother during a specified nine-month pe-
riod of pregnancy, thus setting the temporal boundaries for
establishing the market shares of the relevant DES manufacturers.
214
Beyond DES cases, the practical impossibility of accurately assessing
liability on a market share basis has been an important factor in the
judicial rejection of the market share liability approach.235
Under Calabresi's analysis, the inability of the injured party to
identify one of several-or even one of many-manufacturers that dis-
tributed a specific disease-causing product, standing alone, should not
matter. Each manufacturer would be assessed the financial responsi-
bility attributable to its share of the market for the disease-producing
229. Id. at 173. The amount of lead by weight in paint ranged from less than 2% to
more than 70%. Compare Am. Standards Ass'n, American Standard Specifications to Mini-
mize Hazards to Children from Residual Surface Coating Materials (Standard Z66.1-1955)
(1955) (voluntary industry standard adopted in 1955 limiting lead content in paint to no
more than 1% of total weight), with BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
United States Government Master Specification for Paint, White, and Tinted Paints Made on a White
Base, Semipaste, and Ready Mixed (Fed. Specifications Bd., Standard Specification No. 10B),
in CIRcuLAR OF THE BUREAU OF STANDARDS, No. 89, at 2 (3d ed. 1927) (requiring that white
base semipaste paint purchased by the federal government include between 45% and 70%
white lead).
230. Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173.
231. Id. at 172.
232. See, e.g., Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191 (S.D. Ga. 1982)
(rejecting market share liability in asbestos cases because "[a] market that is composed of
an amalgam of asbestos products might also yield market shares that are not accurate indi-
cations of the potential exposure to disease created by a particular product").
233. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980).
234. See id. at 937 (noting that one manufacturer had been dismissed from the suit be-
cause it did not commence manufacturing DES until after the plaintiff was born).
235. E.g., In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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product.236 As has been illustrated, however, the passage of decades
between the manufacture and distribution of the disease-causing
products and the subsequent manifestation of the latent disease and
claims by the victims often means that evidence of the respective mar-
ket shares of the manufacturers is no longer available. Hence, courts
or others administering an accident compensation system are not able
to determine which portion of the total damages should be assessed to
each manufacturer.
Market share analysis, at first glance seemingly the type of collec-
tive responsibility that Calabresi suggests in The Costs of Accidents, thus
runs afoul of Calabresi's own principle that "It] he first guideline for
picking the cheapest cost avoider is to seek the optimal relationship
between avoidance costs and administrative costs." '23 7 The determina-
tion of market shares in the context of mass products torts is, at best,
likely to be very expensive and, at worst, impossible. Even if it were
theoretically possible to determine market shares at some expense,
that expense might be justified if and only if the resulting assessments
of liability against manufacturers resulted in a greater savings of re-
sources through primary accident cost reduction.
B. The Inability to Assess Liability to the Activity Causing the Disease
There is, however, an even more basic problem with market share
liability or any other form of collective responsibility when measured
against the criterion of how effectively it addresses the goal of primary
accident cost avoidance. The passage of time and the fungible or
nearly fungible nature of products causing latent diseases create a
more important obstacle than either the impossibility of identifying
the specific defendant causing a claimant's disease or even the inabil-
ity to establish the appropriate respective shares of financial responsi-
bility among the product manufacturers. These factors also
frequently make it impossible to impose liability for the latent diseases
on the activity that causes the disease.
The first complication contributing to the inability of an accident
compensation system to assess liability to the activity causing the harm
is that producers of a significant portion of the disease-causing prod-
ucts may have gone out of business or may be insolvent, particularly
when substantial past liability judgments already have exceeded availa-
ble insurance coverage limits-such as in the asbestos context. To the
236. See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text (discussing the assessment of mar-
ket share liability in light of Calabresi's sevdrance of primary cost avoidance from secon-
dary cost avoidance).
237. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 143.
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extent that it is possible to determine the percentage of disease-pro-
ducing products manufactured by each firm, some portion of dam-
ages may go unpaid because of the absence of financial contributions
from some of those who manufactured injury-producing products. It
is also possible, however, that in the absence of information sufficient
to prove the firms' respective shares of production of disease-causing
products, courts would hold firms jointly and severally liable, leaving
the remaining solvent firms over which the court has jurisdiction lia-
ble for the shares of insolvent or bankrupt producers or those of man-
ufacturers outside the jurisdiction of the court.238 One suspects that
Calabresi might endorse this approach for two reasons. First, the in-
jury-producing activity is being forced to pay the damages caused by
such activity (there being no requirement that any individual firm pay
for damages directly attributable to its own products) .239 Second, the
courts and the manufacturers themselves would determine the respec-
tive shares of liability; the burden of proving proportionate shares
would not lie with the victims.
The second-and more important-complication is that most
firms manufacture other products in addition to the one that caused
the harm, and the product mix differs from one manufacturer to an-
other. In a world with transaction costs, if a former manufacturer of
asbestos insulation materials is no longer manufacturing insulation
containing asbestos, but is manufacturing only non-asbestos insulation
or any other product that does not cause harm, it probably does not
serve primary accident cost avoidance goals to have that firm pay for
damages attributable to a product manufactured forty years ago. In
the unlikely event that all firms that had once produced asbestos insu-
lation now produce non-asbestos insulation and their respective
shares of the market for insulation remained constant throughout the
decades, with no firms either entering or leaving the marketplace, in-
sulation producers could simply charge more for non-asbestos insula-
tion, pass the asbestos liability costs onto the consumers, and then pay
their respective shares of damages. The only problem would be that
non-asbestos insulation would be artificially overpriced, resulting in
less consumption of non-asbestos insulation than would otherwise be
desirable.
It is more likely, however, that firms that once produced asbestos
products-if they remained solvent-now produce a variety of other
238. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 940 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that
defendants that are amenable to suit will be jointly and severally liable for all of a plaintiff's
injuries even though their shares of the market are much smaller).
239. See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
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products and, in a competitive marketplace, are not able to pass on to
consumers the costs of their liabilities resulting from their now-discon-
tinued distribution of asbestos products. As a result, unless the firm
producing the injurious product carried liability coverage with an ex-
posure trigger at the time of the distribution of its asbestos prod-
UCts, 2 4 0 the net result of imposing liability on the firm now producing
non-asbestos insulation would be to harm current shareholders, most
of whom probably did not own stock at the time of the distribution of
the disease-producing product,2 4' and current employees, all or most
of whom did not work at the firm at the time of the distribution of the
asbestos products. 2 42 These economic and social disruptions are simi-
lar to the ones Calabresi seeks to reduce through consideration of the
goal of secondary accident cost avoidance.243 Such a result in no way
serves the goals of primary accident cost avoidance.
VI. THE COMPLEXITY AND INHERENTLY VALUE-LADEN NATURE OF THE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE CHEAPEST COST AVOIDER
Since the publication of The Costs of Accidents, courts often reflex-
ively conclude that product manufacturers are the cheapest cost
avoiders, without any serious attempt to consider the ability of other
parties contributing to the accidents to minimize the losses. 2 4 4 As the
Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in Fischer v. Johns-Manville
Corp.,2 45 "[m] anufacturers are usually the 'cheapest cost-avoiders.' ,141
This conclusion echoes the analysis of Justice Traynor in his seminal
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.:
[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wher-
ever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
240. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
242. SeeJonathan Orszag, The Impact of Asbestos Liabilities on Workers in Bankrupt Firms, 44
S. TEX. L. REv. 1077, 1080 (2003) ("[O]ur estimate of employment [loss] in firms that
entered into bankruptcy due significantly to asbestos liabilities ranges from 52,000 to
60,000.").
243. See THE CosTs OF AccIDENrS, supra note 1, at 3942; supra notes 119-123 and accom-
panying text.
244. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 827 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Weinstein,
J.) ("As between a negligent handgun manufacturer and an injured bystander, the former
must be regarded as the 'cheapest cost avoider,'-the party upon whom imposition of
liability will lead to the greatest degree of safety and efficiency."). In Hamilton, Judge Wein-
stein, of course, is choosing only between the gun manufacturer and the injured bystander
as the cheapest cost avoider and is not considering the possible role of the person who
fired the gun, who in most instances is unidentified, incarcerated, or judgment-proof.
245. 512 A.2d 466 (N.J. 1986).
246. Id. at 473.
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health inherent in defective products that reach the market.
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the
public cannot.
24 7
Despite the virtually automatic response of courts that the prod-
uct manufacturer is the cheapest cost avoider,24 8 the determination of
the cheapest cost avoider in the context of latent diseases resulting
from exposure to mass products is not axiomatic. In the case of latent
disease caused by any particular product, identification of the cheap-
est cost avoider often is problematic because of a variety of interlock-
ing factors including those previously discussed-the passage of time
and the inability to accurately assess liability to the activity causing the
harm-as well as the presence of multiple other activities contributing
to the victims' injuries or disease, some of which may be more contem-
poraneous in time and more culpable than the manufacturers' contri-
butions. Finally, state and municipal governments now have assumed
roles as plaintiffs in actions against manufacturers of products that
have caused injuries and diseases that have resulted in public health
and safety crises, such as litigation against manufacturers of tobacco
products, handguns, and lead pigment. Governments that have failed
to enact and enforce effective measures to address the social ills of
tobacco-related illness, handgun violence, and childhood lead poison-
ing may themselves be viable candidates to be considered the cheap-
est cost avoider.
This Part briefly utilizes the approach described in The Costs of
Accidents to analyze which party is the cheapest cost avoider-or
whether such analysis is really meaningful-in the context of three
mass products torts that result in latent diseases: asbestos, tobacco,
and lead pigment. As will be seen, often in the mass products torts
context it is difficult or impossible to identify a single party as the
cheapest cost avoider.
247. 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
248. The exception is the case in which plaintiffs conduct precludes recovery. See, e.g.,
Estate of White v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 109 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435 (D. Md. 2000)
(precluding a smoker from recovering from a cigarette manufacturer because he contin-
ued to smoke after warnings were finally given; "U]ust as these later-issued warnings were
futile in altering Mr. White's smoking behavior, any earlier-issued warnings likewise would
obviously have been futile"); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976)
(holding that contributory negligence is a defense to a strict liability claim if the defense is
not based upon the plaintiffs failure to discover the risk or guard against it); Horton v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289, 1292-93 (Miss. 1995) (barring recovery for a smoker,
even though Mississippi was a "pure" comparative fault jurisdiction, on grounds that plain-
tiff's fault was the "sole proximate cause" of his injury).
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A. Asbestos-Related Diseases
The litigation against manufacturers of asbestos insulation and
other asbestos products squarely raises the question of whether it is
meaningful to identify the cheapest cost avoider when the seemingly
obvious choice is no longer engaged in the conduct causing the loss,
and therefore placing liability on that manufacturer can no longer
direcdy encourage it to minimize the loss. It can be argued that while
it is no longer possible to reduce primary accident costs resulting from
exposure to asbestos products, the liability of the asbestos industry
serves to deter other industries from marketing disease-causing prod-
ucts. An argument based upon deterring other industries, however,
cannot avoid the conclusions earlier discussed: that it is rational for
the profit-maximizing manufacturer to pay less attention to liabilities
in the distant future,2 4 9 and that corporate managers will continue to
make decisions on the basis of incentives and disincentives likely to
materialize within their professional lifespan.2 5 °
At first blush, the history of asbestos litigation would seem to be
the ultimate success story for achieving primary accident cost avoid-
ance through the imposition of liability. After all, the accident-pro-
ducing activity-the widespread distribution of products containing
asbestos-has been eliminated. In reality, the history is more compli-
cated and provides less convincing evidence of the role of tort liability
in reducing accident costs. Before the initial successful litigation
against asbestos manufacturers,2 5 1  the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) had promulgated a series of increas-
ingly restrictive regulations that effectively banned the use of asbestos
in most commercial settings. 52 Judge Jack B. Weinstein has attrib-
uted the end of the use of asbestos in the early 1970s to "the greater
awareness of dangers and new government regulations. '" 2 5 3 Even if
one accepts that liability or the prospect of liability from the first as-
249. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part I.B.
251. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
252. See In reJoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 737 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y.
1991) (Weinstein, J.); compare Occupational Safety and Health Standards, 36 Fed. Reg.
10,466, 10,506 (May 29, 1971) (setting an initial standard for occupational asbestos expo-
sure), with Emergency Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,207, 23,208
(Dec. 7, 1971) (amending the initial standard and decreasing the allowable levels of expo-
sure to asbestos particles), and Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg.
11,318, 11,320 (June 7, 1972) (setting a more restrictive standard to take effect in July of
1976); see also Mark A. Behrens, Some Proposals for Courts Interested in Helping Sick Claimants
and Solving Serious Problems in Asbestos Litigation, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 337 n.25 (2002)
(discussing these regulations).
253. Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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bestos claims was a factor in the elimination of asbestos materials from
the marketplace, however, it does not follow that the hundreds of
thousands of claims that came afterwards had any impact in reducing
asbestos-caused disease. Nor does the fact that liability eventually
might have had an impact in encouraging asbestos manufacturers to
withdraw a harmful product from the marketplace necessarily suggest
that the prospect of such liability decades after the initial marketing of
the product served as a disincentive for the manufacturer to market
the product in the first place.
As noted earlier, the evidence demonstrates that manufacturers
of asbestos insulation either knew or should have known, at the time
they distributed their products, of the dangers their products posed to
insulation workers and pipefitters.254 By the early 1970s, asbestos was
no longer used for insulation, pipefittings, or virtually any other use in
the United States.255 Despite this, more than 40,000 complaints alleg-
ing asbestos-related disease are filed each year, and more than
200,000 cases are pending.2 5 6
Therefore, to the extent that we focus solely on primary accident
cost avoidance in the context of asbestos-related disease, it is meaning-
less at this time, for purposes of the 200,000 pending cases and any
cases that might be filed in the future, to attempt to identify a cheap-
est cost avoider. The costs of asbestos-related disease can no longer be
avoided. Even assuming that at the time of the distribution of asbestos
products it was the threat of liability in the future-decades away-
that should have encouraged the manufacturer to show greater con-
cern for safety, the variety of factors previously discussed, including
the limited time horizon of corporate decisionmaking, suggests that
the prospect of such liability likely had little impact on the decisions
leading to the distribution of the asbestos products. Further, if the
asbestos manufacturer had believed that another party-such as the
insulation contractor or other industrial purchaser of asbestos prod-
ucts, or the insulation workers themselves-in fact had been the
cheapest cost avoiders, it obviously would have been impossible, de-
cades after the distribution and use of the product, for the manufac-
turer to "bribe" one of these parties.
254. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083-86; BRODEUR, supra note 37.
255. Falise, 94 F. Supp. at 324.
256. The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act: Hearing on H.R 1283 Before the House Comm.
on theJudiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Paul R. Verkuil, Dean, Cardozo School of
Law) [hereinafter Verkuil statement], available at http://commdocs.house.gov/commit-
tees/judiciary.hju62442.000/hju62442 Of.htm; see also supra notes 39-44 and accompanying
text.
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To conclude, however, that a product manufacturer could no
longer be assessed initial liability decades after the distribution of the
product has terminated, because it could no longer be identified as
the probable cheapest cost avoider for subsequently occurring dis-
eases, would mean that no manufacturer would ever be responsible
for its disease-causing activity when there had been a time lag between
the distribution of the disease-causing product and the manifestation
of the disease caused by exposure to the toxic substance. Manufactur-
ers, in effect, would -always be held harmless for the manufacture and
distribution of such a disease-causing product, even if they knew the
product was dangerous or their conduct was in other ways tortious. I
would argue, therefore, that the mere passage of time following the
manufacturer's distribution of a product should not preclude the as-
bestos manufacturer or any other manufacturer from being held lia-
ble for the costs of accidents, except perhaps where another actor
continues to contribute, to a substantial degree, to causing the latent
disease. In that situation, the other actor can be regarded as the
cheapest cost avoider at the current time, and holding this party liable
for the full costs of the latent diseases would yield the best possibility
of actually reducing the costs of the disease from this point forward.
The other possible contenders for the role of cheapest cost
avoider in the asbestos-related disease context are the insulation con-
tractors and other industrial purchasers, and the insulation workers
themselves. Similar to the contribution of asbestos manufacturers, the
activities of these parties that causally contributed to asbestos-related
disease generally ended decades ago. Thus, there is no basis for pre-
ferring one of them as the cheapest cost avoider on the grounds that a
change in their activities could still minimize losses.2 57
If the determination of the cheapest cost avoider in the asbestos
context were made at the time of the distribution of the asbestos prod-
ucts, and the likely ineffectiveness of holding parties liable decades
later were ignored, Calabresi's criteria for determining the cheapest
257. Because of the synergistic effects of exposure to asbestos and smoking as causes of
cancer, Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 327, the ongoing smoking of a former asbestos worker is a
factor suggesting that the smoking asbestos worker himself is the cheapest cost avoider
when the harm caused is lung cancer. Calabresi advises that the determination of the
cheapest cost avoider should not be made on a case-by-case basis. THE COSTS OF Acci-
DENTS, supra note 1, at 255-59. It would be possible, of course, to make separate collective
determinations of the cheapest cost avoider for (1) asbestos workers who never smoked or
who have stopped smoking, and (2) asbestos workers who continued to smoke. The issues
here are very similar to those involving victims of tobacco-related illnesses who continued
to smoke following widespread recognition of the seriousness of health consequences
caused by cigarette smoking. See infra notes 260-277.
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cost avoider would point to the manufacturers of asbestos insulation
and other products. The manufacturers either had, or should have
had, greater knowledge of the risks caused by exposure to asbestos. 258
Calabresi also notes that if the administrative costs of finding the
cheapest cost avoider are too high, it may be preferable to settle for a
"slightly more expensive cost avoider. ' 259 This suggests that manufac-
turers, and not contractors (generally small businesses) should be
chosen. A former insulation worker suffering from asbestos-related
disease may have worked with multiple insulation contractors, and
one or more of these contractors may now be out of business. While
one of these contractors may be the cheapest cost avoider, there are
fewer manufacturers to choose from, and it will likely be less expen-
sive to determine who among them is the next best cheapest cost
avoider. Finally, at the time of the distribution of the product, the
manufacturer was "the best briber," the party in the best position to
identify the cheapest cost avoider if it were not the manufacturer
(which in this case seems unlikely) and change its behavior through
warning labels and other means. Therefore, application of Calabresi's
factors suggests that among the parties whose activities contributed to
asbestos-related disease, the asbestos product manufacturers are the
best candidate for the role of the cheapest cost avoider. This conclu-
sion does nothing, however, to change the fact that the passage of
decades since the manufacturer's activities, as well as the inability to
assess the costs of the diseases to the activity causing the harm, renders
any notion of primary accident cost avoidance problematic.
B. Tobacco-Related Diseases
The analysis of which party is the cheapest cost avoider in the
case of tobacco-related illness differs from the analysis in the asbestos-
related contexts in several regards. On one hand, the activities of the
manufacturers that contribute to tobacco-related illnesses continue.
Designating tobacco manufacturers as the cheapest cost avoider and
imposing liability on this group may therefore directly lead to loss
minimization.2 6 ° On the other hand, it is at least arguable that other
258. See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1083-861; Falise, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 324-25. See generally BRODEUR,
supra note 37.
259. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 143-44.
260. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that it was the possibility of potential
legal liability for the damages caused by tobacco-related diseases that caused tobacco com-
panies to agree to the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998. As Professor Rabin
notes, the MSA did not contain a number of harsh regulatory measures that were part of a
previous settlement proposal that died in Congress. Rabin, Tobacco Litigation, supra note
62, at 34041. While the MSA did include a number of public health measures, most nota-
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
parties-the smokers themselves 261 and perhaps the state or federal
government-may be the cheapest cost avoider.
The easiest case for finding that tobacco companies are the
cheapest cost avoider occurs for those victims of tobacco-related dis-
eases who smoked cigarettes before the mid-1960s, have not smoked
since then, and have only recently developed a tobacco-related dis-
ease. 26 2 While it was common knowledge among the public prior to
the mid-1960s that smoking posed a health risk, the public often did
not understand the strong connection between cigarette smoking and
cancer that was known to tobacco manufacturers. 6 3 By the 1990s, it
was clear that tobacco companies not only had deliberately concealed
the risks posed by cigarettes, but also had intentionally designed their
products to foster addiction. 26 4 For tobacco-related illnesses in smok-
ers who had quit by the mid-1960s, tobacco companies are the obvious
choice as the cheapest cost avoider because they were in the best posi-
tion to minimize losses through reducing or eliminating production,
raising prices, providing warnings, designing a safer cigarette, or some
combination of these approaches. Further, prior to the 1960s, the
manufacturer arguably was in the best position to bribe smokers, who
were the other actors who caused the disease, to reduce their smok-
ing, presumably through higher prices and comprehensive warning
labels. 26' The administrative costs involved in identifying and locating
bly bans on advertising aimed at youths, it did not include the provisions that the tobacco
industry feared most: acknowledgement of FDA jurisdiction over its products and mone-
tary "look back" penalties that would be assessed if underage smoking did not decrease at a
specified rate. Id. In agreeing to the settlement, the tobacco companies seemed less moti-
vated by the threat of legal liability than they were by the desire to avoid these measures.
261. But see Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1254-55 (NJ. 1990)
(rejecting defendant's argument that the smoker is the cheapest cost avoider).
262. E.g., Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 219 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff's husband
smoked cigarettes from 1950 until 1965, quit shortly after the Surgeon General's Report,
and developed lung cancer in 1992).
263. Id. at 573 (noting expert testimony that "people thought cigarette smoke was sim-
ply as dangerous as breathing city air").
264. See Rabin, Third Wave, supra note 62, at 183-84.
265. The Congressional Budget Office has stated that "a 10 percent increase in price
would result in a decrease in cigarette consumption of between 2.5 percent and 7.0 per-
cent." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: ISSUES FROM A FEDERAL
PERSPECTIVE 32 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=407&se-
quence=0. The study concluded that warning labels themselves are not as effective as in-
creases in the price of cigarettes, but that a combined program of cigarette warnings,
tobacco advertisement restrictions, public and workplace restrictions, and smoking cessa-
tion programs would decrease youth smoking by up to 4.5% and adult smoking by 5%. Id.
at 29. For helpful links to related empirical data, see NAT'L CANCER POLICY BD., STATE
PROGRAMS CAN REDUCE TOBACCO USE (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/html/state-
tobacco.
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the manufacturer whose product caused a particular victim's disease,
however, may be significant. As previously discussed, unless the victim
is aware which manufacturer produced the cigarettes he smoked, the
identification of a specific manufacturer as the cheapest cost avoider
with respect to harm suffered by a particular victim of tobacco-related
illness is likely difficult or impossible.
The determination of the cheapest cost avoider is more complex
for those victims of tobacco-related illness who began smoking prior
to the mid-1960s but did not quit when the connection between smok-
ing and cancer became publicly known, and it is particularly difficult
for those who began smoking after the mid-1990s. Public awareness
of the link between cigarette smoking and cancer significantly in-
creased with the 1964 release of the Surgeon General's report
26 6 and
the surrounding publicity, and soon thereafter Congress enacted leg-
islation requiring cigarette manufacturers to place health warnings on
each package of cigarettes.2 67 Because this group of smokers had
greater awareness of the risks of smoking, it is possible that they, not
the tobacco companies, are the cheapest cost avoider.
Victims of tobacco-related disease, particularly those who began
smoking prior to the mid-1960s, will argue that the tobacco compa-
nies are the cheapest cost avoider because the addictive properties of
cigarettes make it difficult to quit smoking.26 8 Furthermore, they can
argue that tobacco companies remain the cheapest cost avoider be-
cause they have a superior understanding of the risks of cigarette
smoking 269 and because product warnings are ineffective in minimiz-
ing losses. 270 Designating the victim of tobacco-related disease as the
cheapest cost avoider also is more likely to lead to externalization of
the costs of tobacco-related disease. Often the medical costs allocated
266. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., PUB. No. 1103, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOK-
ING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964).
267. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. (79 Stat. 282) 298, 299 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(2000)); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat. 93) 93, 93 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000)).
268. See, e.g., Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan. 2002)
(allowing punitive damages of $15 million against tobacco manufacturers for their conceal-
ment of the addictive nature of cigarettes).
269. E.g., Tompkin v. Am. Brands, 219 F.3d 566, 572-75 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding as a
triable question the issue of whether consumers were aware of the "specific linkages be-
tween smoking and lung cancer" that were known to manufacturers); Burton, 205 F. Supp.
at 1256-57 (finding that the defendants were aware of the addictive nature of nicotine and
tobacco's health-related dangers and concealed this information from smokers).
270. See generally Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. REv. 1193 (1994).
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to the victims would in fact be paid by state medical assistance pro-
grams or by medical insurers.27 ' Finally, allocating the costs to the
victims more likely increases the secondary costs of accidents because
some of the costs of tobacco-related diseases would remain with the
smoking victims themselves, thus leading to greater disruption than if
such costs were allocated to tobacco companies and distributed
through higher cigarette prices or liability insurance.
The possibility that the victims of tobacco-related illness should
be designated as the cheapest cost avoider is far more plausible with
the group of victims who began smoking recently than it was with
those who began and stopped smoking prior to the mid-1960s. At
least if viewed on an individual basis, as contrasted with looking at
smokers as a group, is not the highly educated person with a family
history of lung cancer who became a chain-smoker after 1965 the
cheapest cost avoider? (Not to mention suicidal?) As a group, ciga-
rette smokers, if not themselves the cheapest cost avoiders, also can be
viewed as excellent bribers: to the extent they stop purchasing ciga-
rettes, tobacco companies will stop producing them.
Note also that despite Calabresi's desire to move accident com-
pensation beyond determinations of the fault of the parties,272 the de-
termination of the cheapest cost avoider to prevent tobacco-related
illness almost certainly requires a comparison of the relative degrees
of knowledge of manufacturers and smokers regarding the risks of
smoking. Unavoidably, tobacco litigation-and, in the alternative, the
determination of the cheapest cost avoider-may still resemble what
Rabin has described as "a last vestige of a perhaps idealized vision of
nineteenth century tort law as an interpersonal morality play. ' 273 In-
deed, it is generally the case with products that cause latent diseases
that the determination of the cheapest cost avoider often depends in
large part on the resolution of a question that looks surprisingly like
an issue of fault: Did the manufacturer conceal or unreasonably fail
to discover a risk not known to the consuming public?
In short, the choice between tobacco companies and those who
have begun smoking during the last generation as the cheapest cost
avoider is not as clear as it is between tobacco companies and those
who began smoking in an earlier era. The decision may turn on more
subtle factors identified by Calabresi. For example, placing the liabil-
ity on smokers means that the government and medical insurers, not
271. SeeJon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1224-29 (1998).
272. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 286.
273. Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 63, at 871.
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the victims themselves, will pay a substantial portion of the losses,274
creating what Calabresi calls "externalization due to transfer."
275
Thus, at least in theory, the incentives on smokers to quit smoking are
reduced, though some costs, e.g., the non-economic costs of lung can-
cer, cannot be externalized. Further, the inability of smokers to fore-
see accurately the risks of smoking may also result in "externalization
due to inadequate knowledge, '276 that is, the smoker may not, "be-
cause of inadequate knowledge or for psychological reasons, accu-
rately foresee the risk of bearing [tobacco-related illness] costs
involved in [smoking] ."277
There is yet another player in tobacco-related illnesses. The
claimants in the largest and most successful lawsuits against tobacco
manufacturers have not been individuals with smoking-related dis-
eases or even participants in class actions filed on behalf of smokers.
Instead, such actions have been filed by state governments to "recoup"
the states' expenditures resulting from medical assistance payments to
or on behalf of those suffering from tobacco-related illness.278 Yet for
decades not only did the federal and state governments fail to enact
legislation or adopt programs designed to minimize cigarette smok-
ing, 279 but the federal government also aggressively subsidized the to-
bacco industry.28°  These contributions of federal and state
governments to the prevalence of tobacco-related illnesses arguably
274. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 271, at 1224-29.
275. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 147-48.
276. Id. at 148-49.
277. Id. at 148.
278. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
279. On the history and politics of federal and state government tobacco control efforts,
see Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the United
States, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 62, at 11. The failure of state governments on
this front may be in large part due to the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette Label-
ing and Advertising Act (FCLAA). The FCLAA prohibits any "requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health ... under State law with respect to the advertising or promo-
tion of" cigarettes. 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000). Historically, federal regulatory agencies have
refused to assert jurisdiction over tobacco products, and Congressional efforts to empower
them to do so have failed. See Daniel B. Kamensky, Note, Will Congressional Action Go up in
Smoke? Overcoming Obstacles in Granting the FDA Jurisdiction over Tobacco Products, 86 GEO. L.J.
2677, 2678-84 (1998). In 2000, the Supreme Court rejected the FDA's attempt to assert
jurisdiction over tobacco products. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120 (2000).
280. See Envtl. Working Group Farm Subsidy Database, Tobacco Subsidies in the United
States (noting that subsidies from the federal government to tobacco farmers between
1995 and 2003 totaled more than $531 million), available at http://www.ewg.org/farm/
progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=tobacco (last visited Jan. 12, 2005); see also LucienJ.
Dhooge, Smoke Across the Waters: Tobacco Production and Exportation as International Human
Rights Violations, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 355, 359 (1998) (describing federal tobacco subsidy
programs).
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suggest that based upon primary accident cost avoidance principles
and loss distribution goals, state and federal governments should play
a role in paying for the costs of these accidents. Stay tuned.
C. Childhood Lead Poisoning
The determination of the cheapest cost avoider in the context of
childhood lead poisoning is more difficult than in the mass products
torts previously considered. Here the activities of the lead pigment
manufacturers ended in 1978, but children continue to be poisoned
because of lead-based paint applied to the interiors of residences dur-
ing the preceding century.28 1 Thus, as in the case of asbestos liability,
even if it were possible to trace the products causing the childhood
lead poisoning to specific manufacturers, it would be too late for
those manufacturers to act in a way to minimize primary accident
costs. Such liability would only arguably provide incentives for those
manufacturers (now manufacturing other products) or for other man-
ufacturers to avoid harms caused by other products in the future.28 2
While it may be desirable to hold asbestos manufacturers and tobacco
manufacturers liable for their concealment of the risks of their prod-
ucts so as to discourage such conduct among other manufacturers in
the future, there have been no judicial findings of concealment of
risks by manufacturers of pigment or lead-based paint.28 3
Among the possible cheapest cost avoiders in the lead poisoning
context are the pigment manufacturers, lead-based paint manufactur-
ers, paint wholesalers and distributors, paint retailers, paint contrac-
tors, landlords and other property owners, and (for purposes of
argument only, and for the sake of completeness) the parents of the
children. Let us dismiss further consideration of wholesalers and dis-
tributors, retailers, and paint contractors, both because their activities
that are causally connected to childhood lead poisoning occurred at
least twenty-five years ago and because it is unlikely that any of them
would have been more aware of the dangers of childhood lead poison-
ing than manufacturers, or would have been in a better position to
prevent it.
This leaves as possible cheapest cost avoiders the following par-
ties: pigment and lead-based paint manufacturers, landlords and
281. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Wright v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 94363043/CL190488, slip op. at 12 (Md.
Cir. Ct. June 20, 1996) ("[T]here are no facts which indicate that these Defendants con-
spired with each other to conceal the knowledge of the dangers of lead paint."), available at
http://www.leadlawsuits.com/legaldoc-wright2.htm.
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other property owners, and parents and other custodians of children.
In the 1950s and 1960s, it was popular to blame parents, particularly
low-income parents, for allowing their children to be exposed to the
risks causing childhood lead poisoning, by allowing children to eat
paint chips, failing to maintain a clean environment, and failing to
provide proper nutrition for children. 284 It is now generally recog-
nized, however, that the principal contributing cause to childhood
lead poisoning is the deterioration of lead-based paint on the walls of
older housing stock that produces lead dust ingested by toddlers as a
result of frequent hand-to-mouth contact. 285 To the extent that par-
ents might be the cheapest cost avoiders, placing financial responsibil-
ity on them provides little marginal incentive for them to avoid
poisoning their children. They are less likely to foresee the risks than
are either manufacturers or landlords. Identifying parents as the
cheapest cost avoider also is likely to result in significant externaliza-
tion of the costs of accidents through transfer. 286 State governments
often shoulder the burden of medical and rehabilitation expenses
through medical assistance or other programs and also pay the higher
costs of educating the victims of childhood lead poisoning. 287 Addi-
tionally, parents, particularly low-income parents, are not in a position
to be effective bribers, to encourage others, such as landlords, to take
actions that will prevent childhood lead poisoning.
Thus, the identification of the cheapest cost avoider in the child-
hood lead poisoning context comes down to a choice between the
manufacturers and the property owners, usually landlords. Property
owners can currently minimize losses caused by childhood lead
poisoning, while paint and pigment manufacturers have not causally
contributed to the costs of lead poisoning for more than a quarter-
century. While manufacturers at one time arguably either had or
should have had greater knowledge of the risks of childhood lead
poisoning, the reasonable landlord today clearly understands that de-
284. SeeJ. Julian Chisolm, Jr., Lead Poisoning, Sci. Am., Feb. 1971, at 15, 21 (noting that
toddlers with parents that lack adequate "resources (emotional, intellectual, informational
and/or economic) to cope with the family's needs" are particularly susceptible to lead
poisoning); cf Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 563 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 1990) (allowing defendant own-
ers of residential properties to implead and seek contribution from parents whose negli-
gent actions contributed to the lead poisoning of their children).
285. See Mn. LEAD PAINT REPORT, supra note 74, at 3.
286. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 14748. This is particularly likely in
the lead poisoning context because lead poisoning disproportionately affects low-income
children. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 71, at 2 (finding that 16% of low-income
children living in older housing are poisoned, compared to 4.4% of all children living in
older housing); see also WARREN, supra note 166, at 134-51.
287. See Mn. LEAn PAINT REPORT, supra note 74, at 2-3.
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teriorating paint poses a risk to young children.2"' Even Calabresi's
guideline that states that the administrative costs of determining the
cheapest cost avoider should not be too large 28 9 probably points to
the property owner rather than the manufacturer,29 0 because the vic-
tim can more easily identify and locate the property owner than she
can the manufacturer of the lead-based paint that caused the prob-
lem. Finally, the rental property owner generally is in a position to
purchase insurance against the risks of childhood lead poisoning. 29'
However, in the case of a child poisoned in an owner-occupied dwell-
ing, insurance (except perhaps medical insurance) may not be readily
available. If the child and his parents are not able to recover from a
landlord or the manufacturer, the medical costs resulting from child-
hood lead poisoning may be externalized either to other policyhold-
ers who pay medical insurance premiums or to the government. In
any event, further externalization of costs results when the govern-
ment ends up paying for the additional difficulties caused by the
child's lead poisoning, including educational difficulties and
delinquency.
As in the case of handgun violence and, to some extent, tobacco-
related illness, there is another actor whose activities contribute to
childhood lead poisoning and who therefore should be considered as
a possible cheapest cost avoider. Few, if any, municipalities and states
have enacted and enforced housing standards that could prevent most
childhood lead poisoning, despite the fact that the risks of lead
poisoning from deteriorated housing have been understood by hous-
ing authorities since at least the mid-1960s.29 2 The next Subpart con-
siders the possible role of state or municipal government as the
288. As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Brown v. Dermer
[A] jury could find that a reasonably prudent landlord would realize, after receiv-
ing notice, that flaking, loose or peeling paint presents an unsafe or dangerous
condition and thus would investigate and correct the condition. The effective-
ness of the housing code in promoting health and safety would be severely under-
mined if landlords were permitted to use lack of knowledge that the flaking paint
was lead-based paint as a defense against civil liability for injuries proximately
caused by their failure to comply with the law.
744 A.2d 47, 60-61 (Md. 2000).
289. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 143-44.
290. At least if the cheapest cost avoider was determined on a case-by-case basis, as op-
posed to a collective basis. But see id. at 255-59; supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
291. Property owners, however, sometimes have had difficulty obtaining insurance to
cover these risks. See MD. LEAD PAINT REPORT, supra note 74, at 5.
292. See, e.g., N.Y. City Coalition to End Lead Poisoning v. Koch, 138 Misc. 2d 188 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1987) (suit alleging that New York City systematically failed to enforce federal and
local laws designed to reduce the risk of childhood lead poisoning).
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cheapest cost avoider in the cases of childhood lead poisoning, hand-
gun violence, and tobacco-related illness.
D. Government Recoupment Actions and the Cheapest Cost Avoider
Recent actions by states and municipalities against the manufac-
turers of tobacco products, 293 handguns, 294 and lead pigment29 add
yet another complexity to determining which party is the cheapest
cost avoider. Here, the government itself takes on the role of the
plaintiff and seeks reimbursement or recoupment of expenditures
that it alleges were caused by the consequences of the manufacturers'
distribution of their products. For example, in the Master Settlement
Agreement, tobacco companies agreed to pay forty-six states more
than $206 billion, much of which reimbursed the states for medical
assistance payments to victims of tobacco-related diseases.2 9 6
The party identified as the cheapest cost avoider does not need to
be one of the parties to the litigation. The role of the government as
the plaintiff in recoupment actions, however, helps to focus attention
on the possibility that the government plaintiff itself is the cheapest
cost avoider. Consider, for example, the damages resulting from
handgun violence, also arguably a consequence of a mass products
tort, albeit not one resulting in a latent disease. According to Profes-
sor Kairys, a key figure in at least two major legal actions brought by
municipalities against gun manufacturers, state governments often
have failed to enact and enforce effective handgun legislation that
would have substantially reduced the costs of injuries, because of polit-
ical considerations:
Many state legislatures-and my own is a prime example-
have taken extraordinary actions to accommodate the indus-
try and the gun lobby. Philadelphia and Pittsburgh banned
assault weapons. These are essentially war weapons, but the
Pennsylvania legislature overturned both bans.
The Pennsylvania legislature stopped local government offi-
cials, including the Philadelphia Police, from inquiring of
293. E.g., Conye ex rel. Ohio v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 1999).
294. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); City
of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
295. E.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 1-03-3766, 2005 Ill. App. LEXIS 14
(Ill. App. Ct. Jan. 14, 2005); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 37 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001).
296. MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT § IX (1998), available at http://caag.state.ca.us/
tobacco/pdf/lmsa.pdf; see also McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252,
1253-55 (lth Cir. 2001) (outlining the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement).
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people who apply for a concealed carrying permit about the
reasons that they want to carry a gun.
The regulatory scheme on the federal and state levels is sur-
prisingly underwhelming ....
There is an oversaturation of handguns in areas of the coun-
try that are characterized by less stringent regulations ...
This history suggests that state and local authorities may be in a
better position to avoid the costs of injuries from handguns through
gun control and licensing laws than are gun manufacturers.298 Addi-
tionally, municipal or state authorities probably are the best bribers,
because they are in a better position to influence the actions of those
who truly can avoid the costs of accidents. 2 9 In the case of criminal
handgun violence, presumably the assailant is the party that can most
easily prevent the violence, but the imposition of financial liability di-
rectly on the assailant is unlikely to have a greater deterrent effect
than the threat of a prison sentence. Furthermore, the government is
in a better position to influence the criminal's conduct through nega-
tive bribes, that is, harsh criminal sanctions, than is the manufacturer
of the handgun. Even if we focus specifically on the distribution of
handguns, the government is probably still the cheapest cost avoider.
In the suit brought by Camden County, New Jersey, against handgun
manufacturers, the complaint alleged that the defendant manufactur-
ers did "not limit, or require their distributors and dealers to limit, the
number, purpose or frequency of handgun purchases, nor [did] they
monitor or supervise their distributors or dealers for practices or poli-
cies that facilitate access to handguns for criminal purpose."300 Pre-
sumably these same allegations could be applied even more
297. David Kairys, The Origin and Development of the Governmental Handgun Cases, 32
CONN. L. REV. 1163, 1170-71 (2000).
298. In order to simplify the analysis, this conclusion ignores the reality that effective
gun control measures undertaken by authorities in one state or municipality often are
circumvented by criminals purchasing guns in a separate locality. See, e.g., Tom Stacy &
Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 247, 285 (1997)
("Given the interstate mobility of people and guns, one state's stringent gun control mea-
sure can be substantially undermined if bordering states choose not to enact such a
measure.").
299. Of course, sovereign immunity principles and the related public duty doctrine
often preclude the liability of municipal and state authorities for failure to enforce statutes
and ordinances. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 268-272, at 715-32
(2000).
300. David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and the Elements and Underlying Policies
of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1175, 1179 n.16 (2000) [hereinafter Elements and
Underlying Policies] (quoting Second Am. Compl. and Jury Demand 15, Camden County
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appropriately to state and municipal authorities. In the real world, of
course, the powerful political lobby of the gun industry and gunown-
ers often prevents the government from taking the actions that it, as
the cheapest cost avoider, should take to avoid injury from gun
violence.30 '
Similarly, local housing authorities that are aware (or should be
aware) of the risks of childhood lead poisoning from poorly main-
tained, older housing, and nevertheless fail to enforce local housing
codes are, along with property owners, viable contenders for the role
of cheapest cost avoiders.30 2 They are in the best position to enforce
local housing codes and thus prevent the vast bulk of childhood lead
poisoning.
Note that the argument that the government is the cheapest cost
avoider and ought to pay the costs of certain mass products torts is not
the same as the assertion that the government, in its role of providing
for the general welfare, ought to compensate victims of accidents or
injuries through a social welfare system. In The Costs of Accidents, Cala-
bresi repeatedly criticizes compensation of accident victims through
government social welfare systems financed by general revenue
taxes.3 ' 3 Calabresi is correct in claiming that without consideration of
the government's possible role as the cheapest cost avoider, transfer-
ring financial responsibility to the government for the costs of acci-
dents destroys the incentives for accident cost reduction otherwise
placed upon the cheapest cost avoider. Where the government itself
is in an excellent position to avoid or at least substantially reduce the
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 99CV2518 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 6,
2000)).
301. Those opposed to government recoupment actions have charged that the litigation
is an attempt to circumvent the legislative process. See, e.g., Anne Giddings Kimball 
&
Sarah L. Olson, Municipal Firearm Litigation: Ill Conceived from Any Angle, 32 CONN. L. REv.
1277, 1278 (2000) (characterizing government recoupment actions as "an effort to bypass
appropriate legislative channels to achieve impermissible regulation of interstate com-
merce in firearms through the courts"). Furthermore, proponents of government recoup-
ment actions have come close to admitting this. See Kairys, Elements and Underlying Policies,
supra note 300, at 1181. Without necessarily agreeing with the argument that litigation
brought by the attorney general or other executive branch officials would be illegitimate
when the legislative branch has refused to effectively regulate handguns, it nevertheless
would seem implausible to argue that the government cannot be held to be the cheapest
cost avoider because political pressures prevented the legislative branch from effectively
minimizing the damages caused by handgun violence.
302. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. Again, I am ignoring the fact that in the
real world, state and local governments and their officials would generally be immune
from such liability. See supra note 299.
303. E.g., THE CosTs oF AccIoENTs, supra note 1, at 6-7, 148, 284-85, 311.
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costs resulting from mass products torts, however, there is no reason
to release the government from financial responsibility.
E. The Cultural and Political Construction of the Cheapest Cost Avoider
The critical term in the Calabresian analysis, "cheapest cost
avoider" has the ring of virtually scientific, objective, value-neutral eco-
nomics. What could be freer of cultural and political considerations
than a determination of which party could most cheaply avoid the
accident?
The examples of mass products torts resulting in latent diseases,
however, reveal that the determination of the cheapest cost avoider isinherently a political choice. Take the case of tobacco-related ill-
nesses. 30 4 On one hand, once information about the disease-causing
properties of smoking is widely known to all parties, an individual
smoker presumably is in the best position to refrain from smoking,
and hence is the cheapest cost avoider Until the last decade, the lia-bility system's response to tobacco reflected this choice. In early to-bacco cases-and indeed in a comment to The Restatement (Second) ofTorts section 402A 3 5
-the conclusion was that "consumers must bear
the generally recognized risks of a standardized product."306 The
,moral judgment" of juries throughout the 1980s was that smokers,particularly those who continued to smoke after learning the dangers
of smoking, were at fault.3 0 7 On the other hand, tobacco companies
are arguably the cheapest cost avoider. They are in the best position
to limit production, raise the costs of cigarettes, lower the content of
addictive substances such as nicotine, vividly advertise the health risks
of smoking, and curtail marketing practices focused on youth. The
obligations imposed on tobacco manufacturers by the Master Settle-
ment Agreement in 1998 acknowledge, implicitly at least, tobacco
manufacturers as the cheapest cost avoider.
Inherent ambiguity in the meaning of the concept of cheapest
cost avoider means that in many latent disease cases the determina-
tion will be made on the basis of politics and culture, not economics.
Do we trust individuals, at least when provided with all relevant infor-
mation, to make their own decision to smoke or not to smoke? Or,from a public health perspective, do we decide that manufacturers of
tobacco products are the cheapest cost avoiders? The choice necessa-
304. See supra Part VI.B.
305. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i ("Good tobacco is not unreasona-bly dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful .").
306. Rabin, Sociolegal History, supra note 63, at 863.
307. Id. at 878.
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rily implicates our own weighing of the greater social good versus indi-
vidual choice.
Similarly, in the case of childhood lead poisoning, the choice
among lead pigment manufacturers, landlords and other residential
property owners, and local housing authorities as the cheapest cost
avoider is not one that can be decided on apolitical, neutral economic
terms.3" 8 The choice is between landlords and other property owners
whose poor maintenance practices greatly increase the incidence of
childhood lead poisoning today and manufacturers whose distribu-
tion of the product ended more than twenty-five years ago. The
choice of which party is to pay for the poisoning of children continues
to be fought in courtrooms °9 and in state legislatures.
3 1 ° And, again,
state and local housing authorities, most of which have consistently
failed-and generally continue to fail-to either enact or enforce
housing ordinances that would eliminate most childhood lead poison-
ing, arguably are, in fact, the cheapest cost avoider. These choices are
inherently political decisions, not ones answerable by economic
science.
VII. ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TORT SYSTEM IN
ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF Loss DISTRIBUTION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE COST AVOIDANCE
A. Loss Distribution and Latent Diseases
Let us start by returning to Calabresi's concept of secondary cost
avoidance and asking how well the tort system works to achieve this
goal. The tort system as a whole reportedly compensates accident vic-
tims for less than five percent of their total economic losses,
3i1 and it
308. See supra Part VI.C.
309. See, e.g., Brown v. Dermer, 744 A.2d 47 (Md. 2000) (allowing a suit against land-
lords in a lead poisoning case); State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, C.A. No. 99-5226, 2001 R.I.
Super. LEXIS 37 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2001) (allowing a suit against lead pigment
manufacturers).
310. In 2003, NewJersey enacted legislation requiring landlords to eliminate lead-based
paint hazards in their properties, while rejecting a proposal to impose a tax on paint (none
of which has contained lead since 1978) to defray some of the expenses of lead-hazard
remediation. See 2003 N.J. Laws 311 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-437.1 to .15
(West Supp. 2004)). Compare id., withJames Bruggers, Lead-Paint Bill to Protect Children May
Contain Flaws, THE COURJER-J. (LoUISVILLE), Feb. 11, 2004, at Al, available at 2004 WL
55336485 (discussing a bill in the Kentucky Legislature, proposed by the paint industry,
which was attacked by a representative of the Alliance for Healthy Homes because it al-
lowed "paint manufacturers to 'shift the blame' for dangerous lead-based paints they made
decades ago to property owners").
311. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HowJuRORs THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 
9
(2000); see also Sugarman, supra note 132, at 592-94. Many of the losses not compensated
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appears that the existing system does a particularly poor job of com-
pensating victims of mass product torts and of distributing their losses.There are many reasons that victims of mass products torts do not
receive compensation for their diseases, and hence that the losses
caused by their diseases are not distributed among others. As previ-
ously considered, they are frequently unable to identify the specific
manufacturer of the product that caused their illnesses,3" 2 and courts
in their jurisdictions have rejected market share liability and other
forms of collective responsibility for the products causing theirharms.3"' The victim may be unable to prove that the manufacturer
of the product causing him harm was negligent or otherwise had en-gaged in tortious conduct. Further, the culpability of the victim her-
self or of a third party may preclude the manufacturer's liability. For
example, the lawsuit against the handgun manufacturer, brought to
recover damage suffered by shooting victims, fails because the crimi-
nal activity of the assailant is held to preclude the liability of the man-
ufacturer,14 and the plaintiffs own behavior prevents him from
recovering from the cigarette manufacturer.315
The very nature of mass products torts means that some victims
may be deprived of compensation or receive considerably less than
other tort victims because the assets of mass products manufacturers
are not adequate to pay all the claims. For example, by mid-2003,
more than sixty manufacturers of asbestos products had filed forbankruptcy, more than 600,000 claims had been filed, and over
by the tort system, especially medical expenses, are paid by government medical assistanceplans or by first-party medical or disability insurance or employer-provided plans for the
continuation of income. See, e.g., Linda Gunderson, The Financial Costs of Gun Violence, 131
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 483, 483 (1999) (estimating that approximately 85% of the health
costs of gun violence fall on taxpayers because most victims of gun violence are unin-
sured); Hanson & Logue, supra note 271, at 1224-29 (discussing the externalization of thehealth care costs of smoking-related illness); Mark D. Fridy, Note, How the Tobacco IndustryMay Pay for Public Health Care Expenditures Caused by Smoking: A Look at the Next Wave of SuitsAgainst the Tobacco Industry, 72 IND. L.J. 235, 237-39 (1996) (discussing government health
care expenditures on tobacco-related illnesses). See generally JERRY, supra note 182,§ 13A[c], at 48 (discussing health and disability insurance). Nonetheless, "the victims
themselves and their families absorb nearly 40% of medical costs and two thirds of lost
wages." FEIGENSON, supra, at 9.
312. See supra Part V.A.1.
313. See supra Part V.A.2.
314. E.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d536, 541 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting claims against manufacturers because of the intervening
acts of third parties); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001) (holdingthat a municipality lacks standing to pursue a recoupment claim against gun manufactur-
ers because the damages resulting from use of handguns by criminals are too remote).
315. E.g., Horton v. Am. Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995).
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200,000 of these claims were pending.3
16 Many suits brought by vic-
tims of asbestos-related diseases have been dismissed because of the
bankruptcy of the relevant manufacturers.
3 17
Calabresi also argues that "[t]he moral context of accident
law . . . requires some consistency" in the handling of accident com-
pensation claims. 318 The observer assessing the loss distribution per-
formance of the current system for handling mass products torts
cannot avoid being troubled by the variability in the amount of dam-
ages awarded to victims. Professor Peter Schuck argues that the dis-
parity of jury results in mass tort cases is even more troubling than in
other tort cases:
Empirical studies of jury performance in more conventional
litigation suggest that most of the variation can indeed be
explained .... It is much harder, however, to justify variable
outcomes in cases where the identical factual issue-lack of
general causation-is (or at least should be) dispositive of all
of them, yet mass tort cases often violate the basic principles
of system rationality and horizontal equity. In the Bendectin
litigation, for example, a series of directed verdicts for de-
fendants based on lack of general causation was both brack-
eted and interrupted by several large plaintiffs' verdicts.
Similarly, in the silicone gel breast implant litigation, where
the evidence on general causation of immunological disor-
ders was always weak and became progressively weaker over
time, most of the juries rendered defendants' verdicts, but
some of them awarded large damages to plaintiffs, even after
a string of defendant victories.
This variability in outcomes for cases that appear similar on their facts
or that implicate identical dispositive legal principles or facts should
trouble any system of justice that aspires to rationality, fairness, and
predictability. It is especially regrettable when the different outcomes
appear to reflect differences in the lawyer's skill, or in the location of
the court, which is common in tort law generally.
319
Similarly, a RAND Corporation study concludes:
316. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 39, at 40, 71; Alex Berenson, Senate Panel 
Approves Bill to
Establish Asbestos Trust, N.Y. TiMES, July 11, 2003, at Cl; Verkuil Statement, 
supra note 256.
317. See, e.g., MDL 875 Cases Dismissed Because of Bankruptcy Filings, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.:
ASBESTOS, June 9, 2004, at 21 (reporting on the dismissal in In re Asbestos Prods. Liab.
Litig. (No. VI), No. MDL 875 (E.D. Pa.)).
318. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 293.
319. Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L.
REv. 479, 484-85 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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Results of jury verdicts are capricious and uncertain. Sickpeople and people who have died a terrible death from as-bestos are being turned away from the courts, while people
with minimal injuries who may never suffer severe asbestosdisease are being awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars,
and even in excess of a million dollars. The asbestos litiga-
tion often resembles the casinos sixty miles east of Philadel-
phia more than a courtroom procedure.320
The current tort system thus fails if evaluated in terms of Cala-bresi's secondary cost avoidance and consistency criteria. These goals
should remain important priorities of an accident compensation sys-
tem for victims of mass products torts. Further, the relative impor-
tance of secondary accident cost avoidance is greater when addressinglatent diseases caused by exposure to mass products than in other ar-
eas of accident compensation because of the inherent implausibility
that any accident compensation system designed to handle such latentdiseases can accomplish much by way of primary accident cost
reduction.
B. Administrative Cost Avoidance and Latent Diseases
The inefficiencies of the current tort system 321 are particularly
acute in the case of mass products torts because of the possibility that
many of the fact issues necessary to determine whether or not an indi-
vidual plaintiff can recover must be tried and retried for each new
case. Courts generally deny class certification in mass products torts
cases because the requirements that the claims of the litigating class
representatives be typical of the class and that common issuespredominate over individual issues are not satisfied.3 22 Some courtshave allowed the consolidation of mass products liability torts claims
for trial on liability issues,3 23 but others have not.3 24 Though most
courts now, in principle at least, allow the offensive use of issue preclu-
320. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASSToxic TORTS 41 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Doc. No. R-3324-ICJ, 1985) (citation omit-ted); see also In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that inasbestos litigation, "the variation in jury awards has led to complaints that injustice rather
than careful apportionment has resulted").
321. See generally KAKAIIK & PACE, supra note 31.
322. See supra notes 60, 174.
323. E.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (consolidat-ing asbestos cases for trial on common issues); ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 667 A.2d 116 (Md.1995) (allowing the consolidation of 8,555 asbestos cases).
324. E.g., In re Repetitive Stress Injury Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL-955, 1992 WL 403023(J.P.M.L. Nov. 27, 1992). See generally Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Co-
nundrum, 1995 BYIJ L. REv. 879.
682
2005] LATENT DISEASES RESULTING FROM MASS PRODUCTS
sion,3 25 attempts by plaintiffs to use issue preclusion in mass products
tort cases often have proved to be futile.
32 6
Empirical and anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the costs of
handling mass products torts claims through the current tort system
are very, very substantial, and arguably excessive. A RAND Corpora-
tion Institute for Civil Justice study shows that victims of asbestos-re-
lated disease receive forty-three percent of the amount spent by
asbestos manufacturers on liability resulting from asbestos-related ill-
nesses, the remainder going to attorneys, insurers' expenses and prof-
its, the court system, expert witnesses, and the like.
32 7 Lawyers' fees
for the litigation by the states leading to the tobacco settlements ulti-
mately will exceed $25 billion 328 and, at least after the fact, payments
of these attorneys' fees have resulted in considerable litigation.
329 In
comparison, workers' compensation systems and other compensation
systems that do not require an individual claimant to prove the injur-
ing party's fault have much lower administrative costs than those of
the tort system.
330
VIII. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR DESIGNING COMPENSATION
SYSTEMS FOR LATENT DISEASES RESULTING FROM EXPOSURE
TO MASS PRODUCTS
The prescription of a compensation system for any particular
mass products tort, much less an all-inclusive compensation system for
handling all mass products torts, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the analysis presented does suggest some principles to
guide the distribution of the costs of latent diseases resulting from
exposure to mass products.
325. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
326. E.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982); Migues v.
Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1981); Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offen-
sive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70
IOWA L. REV. 141, 224 (1984) ("[Clollateral estoppel has little potential to make a signifi-
cant contribution in resolving the judicial administration difficulties engendered by asbes-
tos litigation.").
327. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 39, at 61.
328. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and
Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WAsH. U. L.Q. 653, 700, 721 (2003).
329. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Chesley, 749 N.Y.S.2d 842 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2002) (overturning arbitration determination of $1.25 billion dollars in tobacco
lawyers' fees); Minn. High Court Asked to Rule on Tobacco Fee, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ToBAcco,
Feb. 3, 2000, at 5 (describing a challenge to a $440.8 million fee award for attorneys repre-
senting the State of Minnesota in tobacco litigation).
330. See, e.g.,John G. Fleming, Is There aFuturefor Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1207 (1984)
(noting that transaction eosts are under 10% for both the New Zealand no-fault compensa-
tion plan and the Ontario workers' compensation program).
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A. Summary of the Peculiar Challenges to Loss Avoidance Objectives and
Their Implications for Compensation Systems
As this Article has shown, latent diseases resulting from exposure
to mass products pose peculiar challenges to the goal of primary acci-
dent cost reduction. First, in the contexts of those products such as
DES, asbestos, or lead-based paint, where there is a substantial delay,
often decades, between the product manufacturer's activities that
causally contribute to the disease and the onset of the disease, the
imposition of liability following the manifestation of the disease is too
remote in time-at least when the manufacturer is no longer distrib-
uting the product-to serve as an effective disincentive to discourage
the product manufacturer from distributing the disease-causing
product.331
Second, liability for latent diseases often cannot be assessed
against the activity causing the disease-the manufacture and distribu-
tion of the toxic product-much less against the specific manufac-
turer of the product causing a specific victim's illness. 32 Many victims
of product-caused diseases are not able to identify the specific manu-
facturer of the products to which they were exposed that caused their
diseases. Most courts3 3 and many corrective justice scholars33 '4 argue
on the basis of principle that the victim should not recover in these
circumstances. Even if this approach is rejected, however, and we, like
Calabresi, view the goals of tort law as instrumental objectives, collec-
tive liability for mass torts remains troubling. Not only are individual
victims of mass products torts frequently unable to identify the manu-
facturer of the product contributing to their injuries, but collectively
the group of injured victims is inherently incapable of establishing,
331. See supra Part IV.
332. See supra Part V.
333. See supra notes 201-205, 211, 216, and accompanying text.334. For example, Weinrib argues that in such cases the "correlativity of right and duty"
that is necessary for a determination of liability is lacking:[C]orrelativity highlights the moral reason for singling out the defendant for lia-bility. Because the actor's breach of duty infringes the sufferer's right, liability
reflects the defendant's commission of an injustice. Liability is therefore not the
retrospective pricing or licensing or taxing of a permissible act. Nor is the defen-dant singled out as a convenient conduit to an accessible insurance pool that
might spread the overall cost of harm. Conversely, correlativity also indicates why
the plaintiff in particular is entitled to recover. The defendant violates a norma-
tive bond not with the world at large but specifically with the person to whom thedefendant owed the duty. In bringing the action, the plaintiff does not step for-
ward as the representative of the public interest in economic efficiency or in any
other condition of general welfare. The plaintiff sues literally in his or her own
right as the victim of the defendant's unjust act.
WEINRIB, supra note 80, at 142; see also id. at 1-2, 10-11, 65-66, 71-76.
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even approximately, which portion of their collective financial loss was
caused by each injurer. Further, many manufacturers whose products
contributed to the latent disease have disappeared from the scene
during the intervening decades. Each manufacturer that remains
generally produces a different mix of products, none of which causes
disease. In these circumstances, placing liability on the remaining
manufacturers places financial responsibility for the latent disease on
the manufacturers of products that have no causal connection with
the disease, or on other unrelated activities.
Third, and finally, many mass products pass through several sets
of hands. In traditional tort terms, the asbestos insulation contractor
or the handgun assailant may be either a joint tortfeasor or even a
superseding cause precluding the manufacturer's liability. The manu-
facturers of tobacco products, using traditional tort language, argue
that the victims of tobacco-related disease themselves are contribu-
torily negligent or have assumed the risk. Any of these parties, using
Calabresian analysis, may be the cheapest cost avoider. Pinning that
label on the manufacturer is not intuitively obvious.
Each of these factors suggests that imposition of liability on the
manufacturer of mass products is not as effective in achieving primary
cost avoidance as it may be in other, more routine types of tort ac-
tions.3 . and, in fact, that the imposition of liability here may not be
particularly effective at all in reducing accident costs. These same fac-
tors may also make it difficult or impossible for the manufacturer to
play the role of best briber: to identify the cheapest cost avoider and
create incentives or disincentives for this party to minimize the loss.
Yet this single goal of primary accident cost avoidance drives much of
Calabresi's own analysis regarding the design of accident compensa-
tion systems.
335. A contrary argument can be made. The more idiosyncratic nature of many other
tort claims, such as those arising from automobile accidents, premises liability, or even
medical malpractice, suggests very few victims of these accidental injuries are likely to pur-
sue claims against their injurers. See DAVID TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PRO-
JECT: FINAL REPORT, pt. A, at S-20 tbl.1 (1983) (describing a survey that found that only
18.7% of those with possible tort claims filed a lawsuit); PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE
OF MALPRACrICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 70
(1993) (finding the ratio of medical negligence claims to actual incidents of medical negli-
gence to be 1 to 7.6). A product manufacturer probably will be exposed to liability for a
higher percentage of the damages it caused than will "non-mass" tortfeasors because of the
efficiencies achieved by plaintiffs' firms specializing in asbestos and other latent diseases
resulting from exposure to mass products and other efficiencies resulting from the availa-
bility of collective mechanisms for litigating claims, such as government recoupment litiga-
tion, consolidation, and class actions.
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The likelihood that Calabresi's goal of primary cost avoidance
cannot be effectively achieved through the imposition of liability in
many mass products torts contexts suggests two conclusions. First,
specific deterrence-that is, regulation achieved by the "collective
method," '36 i.e., legislatively or administratively imposed regulation,
must play a larger role in regulating products that cause latent dis-
eases than in other areas of liability. Regulation of the processes of
product-safety testing, unlike liability for the results of inadequate test-
ing or research, occurs before or simultaneously with the distribution
of the product, not decades later. Thus, the delay between the manu-
facturer's conduct and the manifestation of the latent disease does
not preclude primary accident cost avoidance achieved through spe-
cific deterrence as it does with general deterrence. Specific deter-
rence (regulation) obviously already plays a more important role in
the manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical products, a fre-
quent cause of latent diseases, than it does with other products. Un-
fortunately, the case histories of pharmaceutical products such as
DES3 7 and fen-phen.. 8 illustrate that specific deterrence has not al-
ways proven capable of preventing latent diseases caused by exposure
to pharmaceutical products.
In addition, the frequent inability of legal liability to achieve the
goal of primary accident cost reduction in the case of latent diseases
resulting from exposure to mass products, at least when the product is
no longer being distributed, suggests that other goals-loss distribu-
tion and reduction of administrative costs-should become compara-
tively more important in the design of accident compensation systems
for handling the damages resulting from those diseases. Calabresi
notes that "if secondary cost avoidance were the only aim of accident
law, there would be little reason for stopping short of general social
insurance paid out of taxes and covering all accidents." '39
There may be at least two reasons, however, for not going all the
way toward adoption of a government social insurance system and in-
stead taking an intermediate approach in some contexts involving la-
tent diseases caused by exposure to mass products. First, if it can be
shown that the manufacturer had greater knowledge of the risks of
the product at the time of the distribution of the product or acted
unreasonably in failing to determine the health risks of the product,
then corrective justice grounds point to holding the manufacturer lia-
336. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 27; see also id. at 68-69, 93-124, 174-97.
337. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 58.
339. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 46.
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ble in some form. Second, the current fiscal realities of both the fed-
eral and state governments, characterized by budget deficits and a
decreasing willingness to raise revenues through taxation, suggest the
likely political infeasibility of using general tax revenues to fund new
programs to compensate victims of latent diseases.
If we are prepared to acknowledge the obstacles to achieving pri-
mary accident cost avoidance in the handling of latent diseases caused
by exposure to mass products and to give up on accident avoidance as
the principal goal of any alternative accident compensation system de-
signed to handle such claims, then the compensation system we
choose also could deviate from Calabresi's requirements that (1) the
victims' damages should not be limited to economic losses, and (2)
government funds (general tax revenues) not be used to subsidize
compensation funds.34 Both of these conclusions by Calabresi de-
pend upon the assumption that unless the cheapest cost avoider is
liable for all the damages attributable to its activities, the damages will
not be sufficient to provide the incentives necessary to reduce acci-
dent costs to a socially efficient level. If the imposition of liability ar-
guably fails to create such incentives anyway because of the factors
described earlier,34 ' then our focus in designing accident compensa-
tion systems for handling latent diseases resulting from mass products
should shift to a greater focus on secondary and tertiary cost
avoidance.
If loss distribution and avoidance of administrative costs are rela-
tively more important as goals, no-fault administrative compensation
systems become more attractive as the vehicle for compensating vic-
tims for the damages caused by latent diseases, handgun violence, and
similar losses caused by mass products. It is hardly a novel suggestion
to argue that the traditional tort system does a poor job of handling
mass torts or to propose an administrative compensation system as a
solution. 42 Without addressing the details of the design of such no-
fault administrative systems, I turn now to some of the basic issues that
must be confronted in the context of handling the latent diseases
used as examples in this Article.
340. See supra Part III.C.
341. See supra Part IV.
342. Many commentators, including at least two who have presented at this Symposium,
have suggested administrative compensation systems for mass torts. Seejon D. Hanson et
al., Smokers' Compensation: Toward a Blueprint for Federal Regulation of Cigarette Manufacturers,
22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519 (1998); Hanson & Logue, supra note 271; Robert L. Rabin, Some
Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. Rev.
951 (1993) [hereinafter Mass Toxics].
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B. Defining the Compensable Event
Each case in the traditional tort system generally requires an indi-
vidualized determination of liability through analysis of concepts in-
cluding whether the defendant's conduct has been tortious and has
caused the victim's injury, whether the victim has been contributorily
negligent, and whether the conduct of other parties constituted a su-
perseding cause. Calabresi argues convincingly that "if finding the
cheapest cost avoider is our aim, case-by-case decisions are not desira-
ble, in which case a body like the jury is very unlikely to be suitable for
selecting the cheapest cost avoiders." 43
The parallel challenge for the administrative compensation sys-
tem is to determine the boundary separating cases that are to be han-
dled under the system and those that are to remain in the tort system,
that is, to designate a "compensable event." '44 Each victim then
would be required to prove that her harm had been caused by the
product.345 With many injuries and diseases resulting from exposure
to harmful products causation is difficult to prove,3 4 6 but in two of the
mass products torts contexts discussed in this Article, the causation
question is clear in most cases. Both the asbestos-related diseases of
asbestosis and mesothelioma 47 and childhood lead poisoning 4 8 are
"signature" diseases in which there is a clearly evident and exclusive
causal connection between exposure to the toxic product and the dis-
ease. The situation with an administrative compensation system for
tobacco-related illness is more complex. On one hand, the correla-
tion between certain tobacco-related illness such as lung cancer and
343. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 161.
344. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of
Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845, 886-89 (1987) [hereinafter Individual Action]; Rabin,
Mass Toxics, supra note 342, at 964.
345. Rabin, Mass Toxics, supra note 342, at 964.
346. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Int'l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (exposure to allegedly toxic perfumes); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Or. 1996) (silicon breast implants).
347. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scien-
tific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 203 (1993) ("[A] sbestosis
and mesothelioma are signature diseases of asbestos exposure.").
348. Childhood lead poisoning is a classic "signature" disease because its diagnosis re-
sults from the presence of elevated lead levels in the body. SeeWARREN, supra note 166, at
1. Defendants in childhood lead poisoning cases (whether against landlords or manufac-
turers) sometimes argue, however, that a child's cognitive impairment, behavioral difficul-
ties, and other health problems result from environmental factors other than exposure to
lead-based paint. SeeJennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ Determinism, and Torts: The Example of
Discovery in Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REv. 1025 (1997) (criticizing defendants'
attempts in lead poisoning cases to attribute the intellectual deficiencies of victims to ge-
netic causes).
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other lung diseases and smoking is so strong that they could be re-
garded as "quasi-signature diseases." '349 On the other hand, smoking
increases heart disease rates, but it would be difficult to automatically
conclude that a smoker with heart disease necessarily was entitled to
compensation from such a fund.35° Similarly, the question of whether
a former asbestos insulation worker who smoked and now suffers from
lung cancer should seek his compensation from a tobacco compensa-
tion system or an asbestos compensation system is problematic.
351
C. Funding the Compensation System
The second major issue is how the administrative compensation
system for each disease or injury-causing mass product should be fi-
nanced.352 Calabresi's approach in The Costs of Accidents is first to
identify the cheapest cost avoider, in order both to maximize the in-
centives for loss avoidance by placing the total financial liability on a
single activity and to enable the party clearly assigned initial liability to
identify and bribe other parties who potentially can avoid the loss at
lesser cost to do so."' Elsewhere in The Costs of Accidents, however, he
clearly anticipates that "all injurers should pay, in relation to their in-
dividual wrongdoing, into a fund to compensate all victims, in relation
to their injuries and their wrongdoing."354 Calabresi goes on to state
that such a compensation pool could be funded by "fining wrongdo-
ers, whether or not an accident occurs, to help pay for compensation
of those who are injured, and even by taxing activities and people
according to the likelihood of their involvement in accidents in which
their conduct would be deemed blameworthy."355 In the case of those
349. Hanson et al., supra note 342, at 533-34.
350. Id. at 535.
351. See Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 316, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Weinstein,
J.) (asbestos trust sought contribution from tobacco manufacturers on the theory that the
tobacco manufacturers contributed to the asbestos-related health problems of trust
claimants).
352. See Abraham, Individual Action, supra note 344, at 889-94 (discussing the problems
in developing financing for a fund, including the assessment structure, risk of insolvency,
and retroactive liability); Rabin, Mass Toxics, supra note 342, at 976-78 (noting considerable
divergence between funding schemes in no-fault systems).
353. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 135.
354. Id. at 302.
355. Id. at 306. Elsewhere Calabresi urges caution in dividing the financial liability for
accident costs among multiple parties and illustrates his concern with the following
example:
Assume that an accident involving two activities costs $80 each time it occurs.
Assume also that such an accident could always be avoided by either activity
through the installation of a safety device costing $60 per accident prevented. An
involvement test would charge each of the activities $40 per accident. At first,
20051
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mass products torts where (1) the factors discussed in this Article
make it unlikely that imposition of initial liability on the product man-
ufacturer will result in accident reduction, (2) it is difficult or impossi-
ble for the manufacturer to identify and bribe the party who can
minimize the loss at the least cost, and (3) parties engaged in other
activities systemically contribute to the disease or injury, the fund used
to compensate the victims should include contributions from parties
other than the product manufacturers whose activities contributed to
the diseases or injury.
Let us consider, at least in the broadest possible terms, the fund-
ing of compensation pools for victims of asbestos-related illness, to-
bacco-related illnesses, and lead poisoned children.
1. Tobacco-Related Diseases.-Recall that for tobacco-related ill-
nesses, the candidates for the role of cheapest cost avoider included
the tobacco companies, the smokers themselves, and, less plausibly,
the government. 356 The context of tobacco-related illness is simpler
than asbestos or childhood lead poisoning both because the manufac-
turers continue to engage in loss-generating activities and because ei-
ther the manufacturer(s) whose products caused a specific illness is
identifiable or, at least, the current proportions of each manufac-
turer's contribution to the harm may be ascertained.
Hanson, Logue, and Zamore have convincingly proposed a com-
pensation system for tobacco-related illnesses that, at least implicitly,
follows the analysis suggested by The Costs of Accidents.3 57 Their ap-
proach, at least within limits to be defined subsequently, proceeds on
the basis that tobacco manufacturers are the cheapest cost avoiders
because "smokers typically begin smoking at a very early age, tend to
underestimate the long-term health risks to themselves (and to
others) of smoking, [and] often underestimate the addictiveness of
cigarettes."3 58 They therefore argue that the compensation system be
neither activity would install the safety device. Either might eventually do so as a
result of transactions with the other. But if the cost of entering into such transac-
tions was more than $20 per accident, no transactions would take place and the
accidents would not be avoided, even though if either party were originally
charged with the full costs of the accident the safety device would be installed, as
it should be.
Id. at 158. The obstacles to primary cost avoidance in the context of latent diseases caused
by exposure to mass products, however, simply overwhelm such highly calibrated, simpli-
fied examples.
356. See supra Part VI.B.
357. See Hanson et al., supra note 342.
358. Id. at 521 (footnotes omitted).
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funded by assessments on cigarette manufacturers.3 59 At the same
time, Hanson, Logue, and Zamore's approach, implicitly at least, rec-
ognizes the smokers' potential role as the cheapest cost avoider-
given contemporary appreciation of the risks of tobacco use-by limit-
ing the victim's recovery to economic losses36 ° and having the victims
of tobacco-related illness bear the costs of their own non-economic
damages, which they argue "will . . .encourage smokers to take rea-
sonable precautions. ''1 6  They note that having tobacco companies
pay the economic losses resulting from tobacco-related disease should
not decrease the incentives of potential victims to stop smoking or not
to start smoking in the first place, because under the current system,
the economic losses of victims generally are paid by health insurers or
the government anyway.362
2. Asbestos-Related Diseases.-In many ways, the financing of an
administrative compensation system for victims of asbestos-related dis-
ease would be more complicated than the previous example, largely
because the manufacturers' activities contributing to the losses ended
decades ago, as did the contributions of insulation contractors and
other industrial purchasers who are also candidates to be the cheapest
cost avoider. Similarly, the ability of manufacturers or insulation con-
tractors to bribe others to minimize the losses ended decades ago
along with the disease-causing exposure itself. On purely primary ac-
cident cost avoidance principles, it is plausible to argue that asbestos
manufacturers and insulation contractors should not be required to
contribute to a compensation fund for victims of asbestos-related ill-
ness because any such liability obviously cannot lead them to reduce
accident costs in the specific context of asbestos-related illness.
I nevertheless conclude for several reasons that asbestos manufac-
turers and the intermediaries between the manufacturers and the
workers, e.g., insulation contractors, should be assessed to contribute
to a compensation fund. First, as previously noted, imposing liability
on the manufacturers may serve to encourage manufacturers of other
359. Id. at 522.
360. Id. at 556. The system would provide "medical benefits, partial but substantial disa-
bility benefits, and death benefits." Id.
361. Id. at 559.
362. Id. The Hanson, Logue, and Zamore compensation plan does not require govern-
ment funding; indeed, the consequence of enactment of their plan probably would be to
transfer the government's existing financial responsibility for the health care expenses of
victims of tobacco-related illness to tobacco companies. Yet arguably there should be fi-
nancial incentives to encourage the government to continue programs to reduce smoking.
See supra Part VI.D.
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products, now and in the future, to assure that their products do not
cause disease, though even here the passage of time between the dis-
tribution of asbestos products and the imposition of liability under-
mines the likely deterrent effect.3 63 Second, the activities of asbestos
manufacturers, such as Johns-Manville, were particularly egregious-
far worse than mere negligence. As the court concluded in Fischer v.
Johns-Manville Corp.:
It is indeed appalling to us that Johns-Manville had so much
information on the hazards to asbestos workers as early as
the mid-1930's and that it not only failed to use that informa-
tion to protect these workers but, more egregiously, that it
also attempted to withhold this information from the
public.3
64
This indictment illustrates that Johns-Manville was the cheapest cost
avoider at the time of the distribution of the product, even if the im-
position of liability today would not directly and specifically reduce
primary accident costs. Further, despite Calabresi's general criticism
of a compensation system based upon fault principles,365 this example
suggests the intuitive appeal of granting corrective justice principles a
role in determining liability. 366
The funding of asbestos-related disease compensation systems by
asbestos manufacturers, and possibly also insulation contractors or
other industrial users, also provides a means of distributing losses,
whether the funds ultimately come from the manufacturers and their
sales of other, non-asbestos products, or from insurance.367 This fac-
tor, however, in the asbestos-related disease context, may suggest that
compensation should be limited to economic damages so that the lim-
ited resources of former asbestos manufacturers and their insurers are
not exhausted by payments of punitive damages or other non-eco-
nomic damages.3 6' Again, Calabresi has argued that victims should be
able to recover all the costs of their accidents, including non-eco-
nomic damages, but his principal justification for doing so is that un-
363. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
364. 472 A.2d 577, 587 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
365. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 239-308.
366. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; supra text following note 339.
367. But see supra notes 240-243 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with
this approach).
368. But see Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 478-82 (N.J. 1986) (uphold-
ing an award of punitive damages against an asbestos manufacturer despite the "possibility
that asbestos defendants' assets may become so depleted by early awards that the defend-
ants will no longer be in existence and able to pay compensatory damages to later
plaintiffs").
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less the cheapest cost avoider pays all the losses, his incentives to avoid
accidents will not be sufficiently great to yield socially efficient acci-
dent avoidance. 369 Where primary accident cost avoidance appears
unlikely to result from the imposition of liability, this goal should yield
to the compensation needs of those who will develop significant im-
pairments from asbestos-related diseases in the future.
3. Childhood Lead Poisoning.-The activities of manufacturers of
lead pigment and lead-based paint that have causally contributed to
childhood lead poisoning, like the activities of asbestos manufactur-
ers, ended decades ago."' These actors are neither in the position of
cheapest cost avoider, nor are they likely to be in the best position to
bribe others to minimize the losses. In contrast to the case of asbestos
manufacturers, no court has found that lead pigment and lead-based
paint manufacturers engaged in the egregious conduct of concealing
the dangers of their products or affirmatively misrepresenting the
safety of their product.71 The only possible argument here for impos-
ing liability on pigment and lead-based paint manufacturers is that the
imposition of liability will provide incentives for them and other man-
ufacturers in the future to assure that their products do not cause
harm.
As previously discussed, the childhood lead poisoning context
also includes other possible funding sources that arguably are the
cheapest cost avoiders. Landlords and other property owners of pre-
1978 houses, through assessments on their properties, should provide
the bulk of funding for a no-fault compensation system. 72 These
taxes should be assessed according to the degree of risk posed by the
property: lead-free or lead-abated properties should pay nothing,
properties that have undertaken measures to substantially reduce the
risk of childhood lead poisoning should pay a lesser amount, and
properties that are neither lead-free, lead-abated, nor have under-
taken interim control measures, should pay a much greater assess-
ment.373 Further, as state and local governments today arguably are
369. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
371. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
372. These assessments, of course, would be in lieu of further tort liability.
373. This proposal parallels Maryland's Lead Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, ch. 114,
1994 Md. Laws 1282 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., ENvIR. §§ 6-801 to 6-852
(2002)). Under the statute, the liability of a landlord whose property is in compliance with
standards designed to substantially reduce or eliminate the risks of childhood lead poison-
ing is limited to economic damages with statutory caps. §§ 6-839 to 6-840. As previously
mentioned, I served as Chair of the Maryland Lead Poisoning Prevention Commission that
proposed the Maryland scheme. See supra note 69.
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the cheapest cost avoiders because they are in the best position to
punish property owners who fail to reduce or eliminate the hazards of
childhood lead poisoning, they should provide a portion of the fund-
ing for the compensation system.374 This governmental funding
would provide limited financial incentives for local and state govern-
ments to address the prevention of childhood lead poisoning more
effectively.
One question that remains is whether recovery should be limited
to economic losses. Lead poisoned children have not contributed to
their illnesses and arguably are not the cheapest cost avoiders. On
grounds of equity and corrective justice, this suggests that unlike the
compensation to be paid to victims of tobacco-related illness, the lead
poisoned child's recovery should not be limited to economic dam-
ages. The only justification for limiting recovery to either economic
losses, or economic losses together with a scheduled sum of non-eco-
nomic damages, would be as a tradeoff for allowing recovery without
the proof of fault or other tortious conduct, or in order to avoid the
administrative costs of determining non-economic damages.
D. Transition to an Administrative Compensation Plan
This Article has addressed the possible desirability and structure
of no-fault administrative compensation systems only for victims of
three high profile, contemporary product-caused latent diseases: to-
bacco-related illness, asbestos-related illness, and childhood lead
poisoning. For the most part, the pragmatics of how such systems
might be enacted, presumably by legislation, are beyond the scope of
this Article. Further, I have not explicitly addressed in what circum-
stances an administrative compensation system should be employed to
handle the costs of accidents resulting from other mass products torts.
Hopefully working through the issues arising in the context of three
selected mass product torts has illustrated the analysis that might be
employed in the case of any latent disease resulting from exposure to
mass products.
Professor Robert L. Rabin, in an excellent article in an earlier
issue of this journal, has described the necessity of a "switching mecha-
nism" that would divert traditional tort claims into an administrative
compensation system once the claims resulting from a single product
reached a critical mass. 75
374. See supra Part VI.D.
375. Rabin, Mass Toxics, supra note 342, at 968-69.
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A number of very capable commentators, including my co-panel-
ists,37 6 have identified the challenging issues involved in designing an
alternative no-fault compensation system for victims of mass torts-
particularly the difficulty of defining the compensable event in the
case of a latent disease such as cancer, where there often is more than
a single possible alternative cause of the disease or where multiple
factors contribute synergistically to causation. These are valid con-
cerns. On one hand, it is reasonable that those proposing substantial
change in the handling of compensation for victims of latent diseases
caused by exposure to mass products should bear the burden of per-
suasion. Further, the very nature of adopting any alternative to the
tort system requires the adoption, probably through legislative enact-
ment, of a comprehensive plan with the structural details already re-
solved. At the same time, we must be careful not to demand exacting
performance from an alternative compensation system while ignoring
the failures of the current tort system in handling the claims of those
suffering from latent diseases caused by exposure to mass products-
failures to reduce accident costs and to distribute the costs of these
diseases while controlling administrative costs.3 7 7
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this Article, I have not taken sides in the dispute of whether
tort liability generally deters harmful conduct and leads to accident
cost avoidance.378 Yet the conclusion that the inherent characteristics
of latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass products-particu-
larly when the disease-causing product is no longer being distributed
376. See, e.g., Abraham, Individual Action, supra note 344, at 886-89; Rabin, Mass Toxics,
supra note 342, at 982. In addition to concerns about the administrative feasibility of such
systems, Professor Abraham also objects on the grounds that assessments to fund adminis-
trative compensation would not serve to further the goal of primary accident cost avoid-
ance. Abraham, Individual Action, supra note 344, at 890. I have argued here, however,
that the current tort system similarly fails to accomplish this goal. Professor Rabin con-
cludes that "[a] dministrative compensation schemes offer greatest promise when the com-
pensation-triggering 'event' features a relatively clear relationship between source,
substance, and pathological condition." Rabin, Mass Toxics, supra note 342, at 982. This is
best illustrated by the case of signature diseases such as mesothelioma, asbestosis, and
childhood lead poisoning. See supra notes 347-349 and accompanying text.
377. Cf Abraham, IndividualAction, supra note 344, at 906 (describing the choice among
the current tort system, an administrative compensation system, and expanded first-party
insurance for compensating tort victims as "a choice among unsatisfactory alternatives").
378. Compare, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 132 (arguing that tort law does not serve an
important accident avoidance function and any influence it does have over behavior pro-
duces socially undesirable results), with, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analy-
sis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994) (concluding that
tort law provides a meaningful amount of deterrence).
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(not an uncommon situation with high-profile latent diseases such as
asbestos-related illness and childhood lead poisoning)-may prevent
the imposition of liability from being an effective deterrent, is a pow-
erful one with implications for both tort theory and the real-world
handling of claims for such diseases.
In The Costs of Accidents, Calabresi argues that an accident com-
pensation system should be designed to achieve instrumental goals
and that if we succeed in that endeavor, so long as we handle claims
consistently, achieving the goal of justice will take care of itself. 7 9
Both the limited ability of an accident compensation system to reduce
the harm caused by latent diseases"8 and the complexity-or inher-
ently political or cultural nature-of determining which activity is the
cheapest cost avoider 381 suggest that non-economic factors, e.g., jus-
tice, inevitably play a more important role in an accident compensa-
tion system than Calabresi's analysis suggests. For example, despite
Calabresi's rejection of fault-based liability," 2 I would argue that at
least in the context of latent diseases resulting from exposure to mass
products, the culpability of the manufacturer should not be irrelevant.
If asbestos manufacturers affirmatively misrepresented the safety of
their products and concealed the risks, either knowingly or negli-
gently, I would not find imposition of liability to be problematic, even
if it cannot be shown that the prospect of such liability is likely to
affect the conduct of manufacturers in the past, present, or future.
Nor should we ignore the conclusion of Professor Gregory Keating,
who has argued that the justification for enterprise liability rests 'not
so much' on policies of accident prevention and loss spreading 'as in a
deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot justly dis-
claim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be char-
acteristic of its activities.' "383 It is not that I am necessarily taking sides
with the corrective justice theorists as opposed to Calabresi and other
instrumentalists, but I do conclude that the complexities of handling
at least some high-profile torts, those involving latent diseases, some-
times overwhelm the assumptions of the instrumental models of Cala-
bresi and others.
379. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part IV.
381. See supra Part VI.
382. See THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 239-308.
383. Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1266, 1269 (1997) (quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167,
171 (2d Cir. 1968)).
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The implications for the real-world handling of claims of those
with latent diseases are equally significant. At least in this context, I
think that Calabresi's mentor, Fleming James Jr.,384 was correct. If he
were alive today, James probably would conclude that it is doubtful
whether the tort system is effective in deterring manufacturers' con-
duct that contributes causally to latent diseases,just as he was skeptical
in his own time about the tort system's capacity to prevent conduct
that caused more traditional accidental injuries.3"5 The goals of re-
ducing the incidence of such latent diseases and of compensating vic-
tims of such diseases, therefore, should be seen as separable
objectives, unlikely to be accomplished by a single system. Instead,
direct regulation of research and other aspects of the release of prod-
ucts where there is any foreseeable possibility that the product may
cause latent diseases, should be strengthened. 3 6 Following James's
more broadly applicable recommendations,387 compensation for la-
tent diseases resulting from exposure to mass products should focus
on Calabresi's goals of secondary accident cost avoidance (loss distri-
bution) and tertiary cost avoidance (reducing the costs of the accident
compensation system).
In reality, most claimants who receive compensation from prod-
uct manufacturers for their latent diseases do so through mechanisms
that function very differently than the traditional tort litigation model.
Many compensation systems operating in the real world, in fact, re-
semble the no-fault administrative compensation systems suggested in
the Part VIII of this Article. In a few instances, these compensation
systems are ones comprehensively enacted by legislation.388 In other
instances, however, the administrative compensation system has re-
sulted from a class action settlement389 or has been created by a bank-
384. See Oscar S. Gray, Introduction of Guido Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REv. 734 (2005).
385. See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,
57 YALE L.J. 549, 569 (1948) ("As for that branch of the law which is concerned with civil
damages or their equivalent, it is doubtful whether it contributes very much to accident
prevention."); FlemingJames, Jr., Tort Law in Midstream Its Challenge to theJudicial Process, 8
Burr. L. REv. 315, 331 (1959) ("[T]he pressure of civil liability yields little if anything in
terms of accident prevention if exerted directly against individuals.").
386. See supra notes 336-338 and accompanying text.
387. See Fleming James, Jr., Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1157 (1941) ("The full blessings of distribution can best be attained by
comprehensive social insurance ....").
388. E.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-
34 (2000); National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat.
113 (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247b(o)-(1) (repealed 1978)); Lead Paint Poisoning
Prevention Act, MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 6-801 to 6-852.
389. E.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001) (Agent Orange);
In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
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ruptcy court in proceedings against a former manufacturer-now
bankrupt-of asbestos or another product that has caused latent dis-
ease. 390 Even the state governments' payments of medical expenses
for low-income victims of tobacco-related disease, followed by the
states' pursuit of reimbursement from the tobacco manufacturers, can
be seen as a form of no-fault compensation for some economic losses.
It might be, after all-as Calabresi and other law and economics
scholars would have predicted-that the marketplace for latent dis-
ease compensation systems is working its way toward a socially efficient
solution, even without a comprehensive design suggested by scholars
or imposed by the government.
No. 1203, C.A. No. 99-20593, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12275 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2000) (Fen-
phen).
390. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming the Chapter 11
reorganization plan of the Dalkon Shield manufacturer, which included a provision that
set funds aside for future liabilities); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1988) (upholding the creation of Johns-Manville's Chapter 11 fund for asbestos liability).
See generally Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass
Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2045 (2000).
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